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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the significant governance challenges that 
arise during responses to public health emergencies and proposes a 
new multifaceted strategy—integrated pluralistic governance—to 
address these challenges. Emergency preparedness is an inherently 
complex problem that entails the integration of scientific and medical 
expertise, good logistical planning, and clear laws and policies. The 
governance function has particular import for public health 
emergencies because pandemics, hurricanes, and other disasters can 
have profoundly divisive social and political consequences. 
Moreover, recent disasters like Hurricane Katrina and the BP 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill revealed an emergency preparedness and 
response infrastructure in the United States that was broken: starved 
of necessary resources, beset by problems at all levels of government, 
and undermined by poor decision making at each of these levels. 
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Governance theories are particularly relevant to addressing the 
challenges posed by public health emergencies because these theories 
can help to explain and shape outcomes within complex systems. This 
Article delineates and explores three categories of governance 
models: traditional governance models, New Governance models, 
and diffuse governance models. These models provide insight into 
existing efforts to govern public health emergencies within and 
outside of formal emergency response systems and highlight 
unexplored avenues for strengthening these systems. Integrated 
pluralistic governance adopts aspects of all three governance models 
and encourages the development of concurrency, coordination, and 
redundancy to create a more effective and resilient public health 
emergency response system. 
INTRODUCTION 
ublic health emergencies have cast a long shadow over the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. During these years, infectious 
diseases, natural disasters, and intentional attacks have persistently 
arisen to endanger the health and well-being of populations in the 
United States and around the world. Novel threats to the public’s 
health emerged from many sources throughout the decade, beginning 
with the high-profile damage and loss of life caused by the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the ensuing release 
of anthrax spores via the United States Postal Service.2 Devastating 
 
2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 278–323 (2004) (describing the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks and response). Though not all terrorist attacks can be considered public health 
emergencies, the September 11 attacks and other large-scale potential attacks can have 
significant public health impacts. Additionally, public fears of terroristic threats to health 
have been exacerbated by spectacular terrorist attacks in London, Madrid, Bali, Beslan, 
and Mumbai. See generally ANGEL RABASA ET AL., THE LESSONS OF MUMBAI (2009), 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCEQFj
AA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rand.org%2Fpubs%2Foccasional_papers%2F2009%2 
FRAND_OP249.pdf&ei=51yLUI2NE6KeiALYuIDoCQ&usg=AFQjCNElOOyBJr3FPtcZ
HzXUy1vHWVw9bg&sig2=06ZiUp2Oj63-JHGiS4QH1g (2008 Mumbai attacks); H.M. 
CORNONER, CORONER’S INQUEST INTO THE LONDON BOMBINGS OF 7 JULY 2005 1–65 
(May 6, 2011), http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/docs/orders/rule43-report.pdf 
(2005 London bombings); Dov Lynch, ‘The enemy is at the gate’: Russia after Beslan, 81 
INT’L AFF. 141, 141–61 (2005) (footnote omitted) (2004 Beslan siege); J Peral-Gutierrez 
de Ceballos et al., Review: 11 March 2004: The Terrorist Bomb Explosions in Madrid, 
Spain – An Analysis of the Logistics, Injuries Sustained and Clinical Management of 
Casualties Treated at the Closest Hospital, 9 CRITICAL CARE 104, 104–11 (2005) (2004 
Madrid bombings); Raymond Bonner & Jane Perlez, Bali Bombings Kill at Least 25 in 
P
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natural disasters instigated widespread destruction though a variety of 
means ranging from earthquakes to hurricanes to tsunamis to floods.3 
The appearance of infectious diseases such as Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and new strains of influenza 
threatened to kill and harm people across the globe. 
These recent public health emergencies stand out from prior events 
in part due to the magnitude of their actual and potential negative 
impact on the public’s health and in part for what they have revealed 
about the capacity of our systems to respond. Hurricane Katrina and 
its aftermath revealed an emergency preparedness and response 
infrastructure in the United States that was broken: starved of 
necessary resources, beset by problems at all levels of government, 
and undermined by poor decision making at each of these levels.4 The 
 
Tourist Spots, N.Y. TIMES: INT’L (Oct. 2, 2005), http://travel.nytimes.com/2005/10/02 
/international/asia/02bali.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (2005 Bali bombings). 
3 The most notable natural disasters of the decade include the December 2004 Indian 
Ocean Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in the United States in September 2005, the Haitian 
and Chilean Earthquakes of early 2010, the Japanese earthquake, tsunami, and radiation 
release in 2011, and Superstorm Sandy in the United States in 2012. Beyond these events, 
the United States experienced a number of additional strong hurricanes, floods, and 
wildfires during this time period. Worldwide, additional devastating earthquakes occurred 
in Iran in 2006, China in 2008, and New Zealand in 2011. Floods associated with Cyclone 
Nargis killed thousands in Myanmar, and massive flooding caused substantial destruction 
in Pakistan, Australia, and Brazil.  
4 See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-06-32, A 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA’S DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES IN RESPONSE 
TO HURRICANE KATRINA 18–65 (Mar. 2006), www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/mgmt/oig_06         
-32_mar06.pdf [hereinafter PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA] (assessing the successes 
and failures of the Hurricane Katrina response and providing recommendations for 
improvement); Thomas Birkland & Sarah Waterman, Is Federalism the Reason for Policy 
Failure in Hurricane Katrina?, 38 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 692, 705–10 (2008) 
(concluding that “homeland security” focus reduced federal support for natural disaster 
preparedness and eroded response capacity during Hurricane Katrina); Erin Ryan, How the 
New Federalism Failed Katrina Victims, in LAW AND RECOVERY FROM DISASTER: 
HURRICANE KATRINA 173, 201–11 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2009) (finding that both 
federal and state government failed in their Hurricane Katrina response). Responsible for 
over 1,800 deaths, Hurricane Katrina was the deadliest hurricane in seventy-seven years. 
RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: 
HURRICANE KATRINA 11 (2005), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina 
.pdf (last updated Aug. 2006 & Sept. 2011). The same 2005 hurricane season brought 
Hurricane Rita, a Category 5 storm causing one of the largest evacuations in U.S. history 
with a storm surge that destroyed entire coastal communities of Louisiana with an 
estimated twelve billion dollars in overall damages. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT’L 
HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE RITA 8 (2006), 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL182005_Rita.pdf (last updated Sept. 2011). It also 
brought Hurricane Wilma, which caused the “largest disruption to electrical service ever 
experienced in Florida.” RICHARD J. PASCH ET AL., NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL 
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rapid spread of novel H1N1 influenza around the world in 2009 and 
2010 showed that, despite years of planning, many of our institutions 
remain underprepared to quickly and effectively react to an emerging 
infectious disease that had been widely anticipated.5 The 2010 BP 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the Fukushima 
radiation release in Japan following its 2011 earthquake and tsunami 
demonstrated that technological and political limitations can impede 
the resolution of serious threats to public health.6 
Events like these remind us of the destructive potential of natural 
events on human health and well-being. They also highlight the 
capacity of technology to foster risks of harm to health, whether 
wielded for beneficial, neutral, or malevolent purposes. Since 
additional significant health threats from infectious diseases and 
natural disasters surely will emerge in the future, whether naturally 
occurring or intentionally instigated, these factors reveal quite starkly 
the continuing need for effective governance of public health 
emergencies. 
The success or failure of the response to a public health emergency 
relies on mechanisms and contingencies that are astoundingly 
complex. Complex systems involved in a multijurisdictional, 
multisectoral public health emergency response often successfully 
minimize the harmful impact of health threats.7 Nevertheless, when 
these complex systems fail, they often fail in complex ways, eluding 
easy remedies to diagnose and solve the problems that led to the 
failure.8 
 
CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE WILMA 5 (2006), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf /TCR-AL 
252005_Wilma.pdf (last updated Sept. 2006). 
5 See Lance Gable et al., Public Health Legal Responses to H1N1, 39 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) 46 (2011) (exploring the public health legal responses to 
the H1N1 pandemic). 
6 See Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1105–07 (2011) (discussing how political overlap and 
fragmentation can impede efficiency in the event of a disaster); Daniel Kaufmann & 
Veronika Penciakova, Opinion, Japan’s Triple Disaster: Governance and the Earthquake, 
Tsunami and Nuclear Crises, BROOKINGS: RESEARCH (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www 
.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/03/16-japan-disaster-kaufmann (discussing how 
Japan’s response to the nuclear power plant crisis was subpar, reflecting shortcomings in 
leadership and governance). 
7 See J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 890–901 
(2008). 
8 Id. at 907. 
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Hurricane Katrina, the most obvious and egregious failure of 
public health emergency response in recent American history, 
exemplifies this complexity. The breakdown of the Hurricane Katrina 
response stemmed from multiple factors. Deficiencies in the design of 
the logistical and legal systems for public health emergency response 
resulted in poor emergency planning, inadequate clarity of key 
aspects of applicable law and policy, and political gridlock.9 Further, 
operational deficiencies arose in the system stemming from 
insufficient systemic capacity, poor decision making at multiple 
levels of government, and lackluster implementation of existing 
emergency plans.10 
Improving and strengthening public health emergency response 
systems in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina has proved a daunting 
task that has preoccupied lawmakers, policymakers, health 
professionals, and scholars alike.11 Law and policy debates 
addressing public health emergencies have most often focused on 
questions of power allocation between government entities or the 
structural composition of the formal (i.e., legally prescribed, 
 
9 See infra Part II.C.1. 
10 See infra Part II.C.2. 
11 See generally COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 
HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S. REP. NO. 109-322, at 585–630 
(2005), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?browsePath=109/SRPT/[300 
%3b]&granuleId=CRPT-109srpt322&packageId=CRPT-109srpt322 [hereinafter 
HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED] (analyzing the Hurricane Katrina 
response and making recommendations for improvement); PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF 
FEMA, supra note 4, at 18–65 (assessing the successes and failures of the Hurricane 
Katrina response and providing recommendations for improvement); THE WHITE HOUSE, 
THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 51–82 (2006), 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/ [hereinafter 
LESSONS LEARNED] (providing a list of lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina 
response and suggesting improvements to the federal system); THOMAS A. BIRKLAND, 
LESSONS OF DISASTER: POLICY CHANGE AFTER CATASTROPHIC EVENTS 157–89 (2006) 
(describing lessons learned and unlearned during the Hurricane Katrina disaster response); 
Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the 
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 522–39 (2007) (describing the impact 
of federalism on the Hurricane Katrina response). See generally LAW AND RECOVERY 
FROM DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2009) (analysis and 
recommendations related to improving disaster response); JOHN MCQUAID & MARK 
SCHLEIFSTEIN, PATH OF DESTRUCTION: THE DEVASTATION OF NEW ORLEANS AND THE 
COMING AGE OF SUPERSTORMS (2006) (describing the events leading to, and the political 
and policy aftermath of, Hurricane Katrina); ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM 
HURRICANE KATRINA (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006) (analysis of Hurricane Katrina 
and recommendations to improve disaster response). 
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government-led) chain of authority during an emergency response.12 
Questions of how the governance of public health emergencies can be 
orchestrated more broadly—taking into account the concurrent 
activities and capacities of multiple governmental and 
nongovernmental actors—have received much less examination. 
The overwhelming emphasis on solidifying and strengthening the 
government-led aspects of emergency response raises two concerns. 
First, the presumption that government activities and traditional, 
centralized “command-and-control” organizational schemes form the 
only reasonable model for emergency response fails to consider the 
important contributions of actors outside the formal system to 
successful emergency response efforts. A successful public health 
emergency response often involves marshaling a much broader set of 
inputs and actors to work in concert with the government sphere. 
Nongovernmental participants in emergency response may include 
volunteers, nongovernmental organizations, private sector institutions, 
and community members.13 Second, this emphasis similarly 
disregards options for improving the governance of public health 
emergencies that extend beyond the scope of these formal systems. 
Overreliance on the operation of formal emergency response systems 
can leave these systems vulnerable to failure when specific decision 
 
12 See, e.g., George J. Annas, Blinded by Bioterrorism: Public Health and Liberty in the 
21st Century, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 33, 45-54 (2003) (criticizing the use of emergency 
legal powers by state governments during public health emergencies); Lawrence O. 
Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of Terrorism: Rethinking Individual Rights and 
Common Goods, 21 HEALTH AFF. 79, 86–91 (2002) [hereinafter Gostin, Public Health 
Law in an Age of Terrorism] (defending the use of emergency legal powers by state 
governments during public health emergencies). 
13 See JAMES F. MISKEL, DISASTER RESPONSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY: WHAT 
WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T 17–18 (2006) (describing the integral role of nonprofit volunteer 
organizations including the Red Cross in disaster response); James G. Hodge, Jr., et al., 
The Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity Through the Use of Volunteer Health 
Professionals During Public Health Emergencies and Other Disasters, 22 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 5, 13–14 (2005) [hereinafter Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting 
Surge Capacity] (discussing the importance of volunteers in meeting surge capacity needs 
during public health emergencies); Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: 
Liability and Immunity in Public Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1918–19 (2008) 
(describing a range of private-sector professionals, including volunteers, who may be 
necessary to medical response during public health emergencies); Gabor D. Kelen & 
Melissa L. McCarthy, The Science of Surge, 13 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1089, 1090–91 
(2006) (detailing the role of hospitals and the concept of hospital surge capacity during 
catastrophic events); Monica Schoch-Spana et al., Community Engagement: Leadership 
Tool for Catastrophic Health Events, 5 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 8, 11–21 (2007) 
(highlighting the role of community members in successful emergency response efforts). 
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makers neglect to make good decisions or execute their discretion 
ineffectively, as was the case during Hurricane Katrina. 
Governance theories are particularly relevant to addressing the 
challenges posed by public health emergencies because these theories 
can help to explain and shape outcomes within complex systems. 
Governance encompasses the activities, functions, and exercises of 
management, influence, and control that may be applied to achieve 
designated ends within a system. Nonetheless, a clear understanding 
of governance of public health emergencies remains elusive and 
incomplete. This Article delineates and explores three categories of 
governance models: traditional governance models, New Governance 
models, and diffuse governance models.14 Not only do these models 
provide insight into existing efforts to govern public health 
emergencies within and outside of formal emergency response 
systems, they also highlight unexplored avenues for strengthening 
these systems. 
This Article proposes implementing a novel strategy of integrated 
pluralistic governance to improve health outcomes during public 
health emergencies. Integrated pluralistic governance adopts aspects 
of all three governance models and encourages the development of a 
redundant governance infrastructure to foster resiliency and 
adaptability during public health emergency responses.15 In other 
words, the mechanisms in place to respond to public health 
emergencies should be both pluralistic in that they employ several 
different governance models simultaneously, and integrated in that 
these models are coordinated, or at least complementary, to the extent 
possible. This strategy has two inherent advantages for effective 
public health emergency response. First, integrated pluralistic 
governance recognizes the benefits of different governance models 
and encourages strengthening multiple models concurrently, while 
 
14 See discussion infra Part III. 
15 While redundancy often is characterized as an inherently negative concept reflecting 
waste and inefficiency, I hope to deconstruct this understanding. In some circumstances, 
redundancy across systems can promote innovation, protect rights, and help improve legal 
and social norms. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, 
Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 645–46, 661 (1981) [hereinafter 
Cover, Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy] (showing that jurisdictional redundancy of 
parallel legal forums leads to better outcomes by allowing for the creation of new norms 
and permitting litigants to avoid corrupt judges). See also Robert M. Cover & T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE 
L.J. 1035, 1044–46 (1977) [hereinafter Cover, Dialectical Federalism] (discussing the 
potential benefits of redundancy in the multilayered jurisdiction created by habeas corpus 
petitions). 
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providing resiliency to counter the weaknesses of each respective 
governance model. Second, the strategy creates a redundant 
infrastructure that can circumvent governance failures when they arise 
and achieve good health outcomes despite these failures. 
The application of concurrent governance models through an 
integrated pluralistic governance strategy can avoid failures in the 
public health emergency response system if one governance strategy 
breaks down or moves too slowly, as the formal chain of command 
did during Hurricane Katrina. Integration of these governance models 
could lead to greater effectiveness, transparency, coordination, and 
synergy of effort in public health emergency response. Deploying 
varying governance models can also potentially minimize 
interjurisdictional and interinstitutional conflict during public health 
emergencies by more completely mapping the relationships between 
different participants in emergency governance and resolving their 
respective roles, strategies, and inconsistencies.16 Care must be 
exercised to insure that inconsistencies and power struggles across the 
different governance models do not undermine the resiliency created 
through the integrated pluralistic governance strategy. 
This Article explores and develops models of public health 
emergency governance in detail, focusing on the response phase of 
the emergency.17 Part II of the Article identifies a number of core 
challenges for public health emergency governance. This discussion 
underscores the logistical and legal complexity of public health 
emergencies, the threats that these emergencies pose to population 
health, and the potential for governance failures within the emergency 
response system, particularly when the system is faced with a 
catastrophic emergency like Hurricane Katrina. Part III of the Article 
provides an extensive overview of three models of governance and 
 
16 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 
1768–69 (1995) (discussing how members of society achieve a level of mutual respect 
even when they cannot come to a consensus on the content of policy issues); see also 
GRIFFIN TROTTER, THE ETHICS OF COERCION IN MASS CASUALTY MEDICINE 40, 51–52 
(2007) (applying modus vivendi theory—the idea that parties will not reach a consensus, 
but rather work together “in spite of intractable differences”—to decision making during 
public health emergencies); Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health, Health Care, and Incompletely 
Theorized Agreements: A Normative Theory of Health Policy Decision Making, 32 J. 
HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 51, 51–52 (2007) (asserting a normative theory for analyzing 
health policy and observing “that unarticulated values and norms have a critical role to 
play in health-policy making and reform”). 
17 The phases of emergency response are typically divided into four categories: 
preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery. See 6 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2006). 
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situates public health emergencies within the context of each model. 
This discussion compares the three governance models and assesses 
governance of public health emergencies according to metrics of 
government control and centralization. Part IV synthesizes these 
concepts and makes the case that public health emergency governance 
can be improved through the application of the innovative strategy of 
integrated pluralistic governance. This section considers the strengths 
and weaknesses of the three governance models and demonstrates that 
an integrated pluralistic governance approach can use aspects of each 
model in creating a more robust and resilient public health emergency 
response system built on notions of concurrency, coordination, and 
redundancy. This section additionally explores the challenges that 
redundancy and hierarchy pose to public health emergency 
governance models, and the contributions and limitations of law in 
addressing complex challenges inherent to public health emergency 
governance. Despite these challenges, integrated pluralistic 
governance strategies are vital to avoiding systemic failures when 
dangerous public health emergencies arise and threaten health. 
I 
CHALLENGES OF PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE 
A. Defining Public Health Emergency Governance 
Models of governance describe efforts to influence or exert control 
over events and outcomes within a system.18 Several key aspects 
typify the concept of governance: (1) efforts to manage or control 
events; (2) participation by a multiplicity of actors and institutions; 
(3) use of different methods and tools to achieve governance goals; 
(4) a need to comprehend and navigate multiple intersecting systems 
and priorities that shape the architecture of governance; and (5) 
consideration of a range of normative goals, whether political, social, 
or economic.19 
 
18 See Scott Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 
336 (2004) [hereinafter Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health] (defining 
governance as “the management of the course of events in a system”); Orly Lobel, The 
Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004) (defining governance as “the range of 
activities, functions, and exercise of control by both public and private actors in the 
promotion of social, political, and economic ends”). 
19 Definitions of governance abound within the scholarly literature and cover a wide 
range of variations on the themes outlined in this section. See generally John Braithwaite 
et al., Can Regulation and Governance Make a Difference?, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1 
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Assessing models of “governance,” rather than models of 
“government” or “regulation,” may have significant implications for 
how we understand systems and the effect of law and other factors on 
outcomes in complex systems. The rise in attention to the concept of 
governance in academic and policy circles, therefore, has importance 
since it may represent a paradigm movement toward applying a 
broader perspective on how actions affect outcomes in complex social 
systems. In the public health emergency context, governance involves 
looking at the entirety of the systems and participants relevant to 
public health emergencies and evaluating them as a complex and 
interrelated whole rather than as discrete subcomponents. 
The semantic distinction between governance and regulation merits 
attention. Historically, discussions of regulation focused on efforts by 
the government to authorize or limit events or behavior.20 The shift to 
discussing governance rather than regulation coincided with the 
recognition by scholars and policymakers of a more involved role of 
external, non-state actors in the management of events or behaviors, 
essentially expanding the notion of regulation beyond the state.21 
While some commentators continue to use the terms governance and 
regulation interchangeably, the two concepts may be differentiated by 
their scope and breadth. Governance is a broader concept than 
regulation, encompassing all of the actors and tools that may 
participate in managing events within a system.22 Regulation 
comprises a subset of governance, as the set of law-based tools 
designed to affect “the flow of events and behavior” but not 
 
(2007) (introducing a new journal focusing on regulation and governance, and explaining 
its priorities and interests); Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-
Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter 
Burris, Changes in Governance] (providing detailed discussion and citations for 
definitions of governance). 
20 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING 
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 7–16 (1992) (discussing contemporary trends and theories in 
regulation and deregulation). 
21 See Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in 
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 139 (2008) [hereinafter 
Black, Polycentric Regulatory Regimes] (defining regulation as “sustained and focused 
attempts to change the behavior of others in order to address a collective problem or attain 
an identified end or ends, usually through a combination of rules or norms and some 
means for their implementation and enforcement, which can be legal or non-legal”). 
22 See Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 
1, 29–34 (2002) (finding that regulation is a less broad concept than governance). 
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necessarily providing and distributing activities.23 Thus, governance 
of public health emergencies entails all of the activities, functions, 
and exercises of management, influence, and control that may be 
applied to achieve designated ends during a public health emergency. 
Institutions of government traditionally have been the primary 
actors in governance generally and in the governance of public health 
in particular. Indeed, the population-level goals of public health often 
demand the strong participation of government in order to function, as 
the private sector takes insufficient interest in the collective health 
goals necessary to protect and improve public health.24 Local 
government officials and institutions have taken a direct role in 
governing public health throughout the history of the United States.25 
Over time, the governance of public health was transformed from a 
set of actions within the discrete purview of local governments to a 
more complex system incorporating substantial state and federal 
regulatory efforts.26 State participation in public health was integral to 
the expansion of public health practice, particularly given the broadly 
recognized constitutional authority of the states to utilize their police 
powers to protect the public’s health.27 Federal involvement in public 
health practices began expanding in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, mirroring the augmentation of federal powers and 
proliferation of federal institutions and administrative regulations that 
accompanied the rise of the administrative state more generally.28 
The expanding jurisdictional interest in public health governance 
accompanied a contemporaneous pluralization in the nature of the 
participants involved in public health activities. As the complexity of 
health threats increased and the scope of challenges to public health 
expanded, various nongovernmental actors became involved in efforts 
to manage and attempt to control outcomes in the face of threats to 
 
23 Braithwaite et al., supra note 19, at 3 (contrasting the scope of regulation and 
governance as concepts). 
24 See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 6 (2d 
ed., 2008) (recognizing the primary role of government in protecting the public’s health) 
[hereinafter GOSTIN, POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT]. 
25 See id. at 150–51. 
26 See id. at 155–65. 
27 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38–39 (1905) (upholding state police 
powers to require compulsory smallpox vaccinations). 
28 See GOSTIN, POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT, supra note 24, at 147–65 (detailing the 
historical development of public health governance). 
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health, oftentimes under the explicit or implicit direction of the 
government.29 
This expanded community, together with traditional government 
actors, has led to the development of a modern, multifaceted public 
health system. The Institute of Medicine has recognized that the U.S. 
health system is comprised of numerous sectors and participants, 
including government agencies, the clinical care delivery system, 
employers and businesses, the media, the education sector, and 
members of the public.30 Moreover, each of these sectors operates 
within its own legal environment, subject to numerous, distinct legal 
obligations and standards. Despite the more extensive diversification 
of actors involved in public health governance, however, government 
institutions at all levels continue to play an integral role in the 
governance of public health and take a particularly prominent role in 
the governance of public health emergencies. 
The application of governance as a conceptual model for assessing 
systemic functioning can generate novel ideas for strengthening 
public health systems. By contemplating and attempting to understand 
the complex, multifaceted relationships between actors, institutions, 
methodologies, and outcomes in the context of public health 
emergencies, we may glean new insights into the factors that truly 
affect outcomes under these circumstances. If we can avoid 
piecemeal, fragmented approaches to assessing public health 
emergency response and consider instead the larger systemic 
framework at hand, there is a chance to better comprehend and impact 
how this system is governed.31 
B. Complexity and Public Health Emergency Governance 
Governance of public health emergencies presents a series of 
formidable challenges, many of which arise from the complexity of 
the relevant systems and the effects of public health emergencies. Yet, 
the application of governance models—which can provide context to 
 
29 See id. at 155–65. 
30 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: REVITALIZING LAW AND 
POLICY TO MEET NEW CHALLENGES 27–33 (2011) (describing the structure and 
participants in the health system in the United States). 
31 There is always some danger in trying to assess whole systems or to believe that we 
can engineer these systems to produce the outcomes we seek. Burris, Governance, 
Microgovernance and Health, supra note 18, at 336–37 (noting that moving health policy 
towards a governance approach is not a panacea, and urging humility in engaging in the 
difficult task of trying to manage a complex system toward specific ends). 
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understand complex systems—to public health emergencies has not 
been extensively explored and remains undertheorized. In particular, 
extant legal scholarship in the field often does not address the broader 
systemic issues raised by governance approaches or apply the ideas 
being proposed by governance scholars in other disciplines.32 To the 
extent that legal scholars have devoted sustained attention to health 
governance models, most have explored the fields of global health33 
and healthcare.34 However, the urgency and potential novelty 
engendered by public health emergencies—particularly during the 
response phase when rapid actions are required to minimize loss of 
life—are unlike situations examined in these other areas of health 
governance, which typically assess governance in less urgent 
circumstances.35 
There are several compelling reasons to apply governance theories 
to public health emergencies. Governance allows for a more 
sophisticated look at the systemic factors that apply to outcomes 
during public health emergencies, such as legal systems, allocations 
of authority, organization and prioritization of resources, logistical 
challenges, and application of expertise. Governance theories 
additionally may explain how different actors and actions fit together 
 
32 But see Nan D. Hunter, “Public-Private” Health Law: Multiple Directions in Public 
Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 89, 103–09 (2007) [hereinafter Hunter, “Public 
Private” Health Law] (discussing the growing body of new governance trends in public 
health law and policy). 
33 See, e.g., David P. Fidler, Global Health Jurisprudence: A Time of Reckoning, 96 
GEO. L.J 393, 394–95 (2008) (describing the rise of global health governance through 
global health jurisprudence); Lawrence O. Gostin, Meeting Basic Survival Needs of the 
World’s Least Healthy People: Toward a Framework Convention on Global Health, 96 
GEO. L.J. 331, 383–91 (2008) (recommending the creation of a Framework Convention on 
Global Health). See generally GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS FOR HEALTH: HEALTH ECONOMIC 
AND PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVES (Richard D. Smith et al. eds., 2003) (examining the 
globalization of health through “public goods” theory). 
34 Scholars have applied governance models to aspects of the health care system and the 
medical research infrastructure in the United States. See Scott Burris, Regulatory 
Innovation in the Governance of Human Subjects Research: A Cautionary Tale and Some 
Modest Proposals, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 65 (2008); Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance 
and Deliberative Democracy in Health Care, 97 GEO. L.J. 1 (2008); Joseph V. Rees, The 
Orderly Use of Experience: Pragmatism and the Development of Hospital Industry Self-
Regulation, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 9 (2008). 
35 See Fidler, supra note 33, at 397–98 (noting the unprecedented cross-sector 
cooperation necessitated by public health emergencies); see also Scott Burris et al., Nodal 
Governance, 30 AUSTLALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 30 (2005) [hereinafter Burris, Nodal 
Governance] (proposing a nodal governance approach to improve health in a 
nonemergency context); Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care 
Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139, 146–50 (2006) (assessing new governance 
approaches to everyday health care systems). 
GABLE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2012  8:39 AM 
2012] Evading Emergency: Strengthening Emergency Responses 389 
Through Integrated Pluralistic Governance 
within the entirety of the public health emergency context, as well as 
the methods, institutions, and legal or normative regimes that may 
empower or constrain these actions. This insight is vital to improving 
results during public health emergency responses. The failures of the 
Hurricane Katrina response, for example, hinged on both systemic 
problems (poor design of emergency response systems) and 
operational problems (poor execution of emergency response plans) 
in the government-led response efforts.36 Application of governance 
theories also may provide new ideas for public health emergency 
preparedness and response or may challenge existing orthodoxies in 
these areas. In short, broadly assessing how public health emergencies 
are governed, rather than merely how they are regulated by law or 
influenced by specific plans or provisions, provides an opportunity to 
create a more useful, comprehensive, and adaptable framework to 
address emergency circumstances. Moreover, approaching these 
problems as governance problems can allow law- and policymakers to 
reconsider the potential roles that law can play as a component of a 
system of governance.37 
1. Logistical Complexity in Public Health Emergency Governance 
Public health emergencies are among the most complex situations 
to govern given the social disruption, impact on health, and 
extraordinary circumstances that often surround such emergencies. 
Events that meet the definition of a public health emergency38 
 
36 See infra Part II.C for more discussion of systemic and operational failures generally 
and during Hurricane Katrina. 
37 On this issue, I concur with Professor Nan Hunter’s observation that “public health 
law offers the opportunity to study the interaction of varying models of governance as they 
develop, in real time.” Hunter, supra note 32, at 119. 
38 Legal definitions of “public health emergency” at both the federal and state levels 
concur with this distinction between emergency and normal circumstances. The federal 
Public Health Service Act defines a public health emergency as “a disease or disorder . . . 
including significant outbreaks of infectious diseases or bioterrorist attacks.” 42 U.S.C. § 
247d(a) (2006). A more descriptive definition, which has been widely used at the state 
level, is offered by the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA). It defines 
a “public health emergency” as: 
[A]n occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that: 
(1) is believed to be caused by any of the following: (i) bioterrorism; (ii) the 
appearance of a novel or previously controlled or eradicated infectious agent or 
biological toxin; (iii) [a natural disaster;] (iv) [a chemical attack or accidental 
release; or] (v) [a nuclear attack or accident]; and (2) poses a high probability of 
any of the following harms: (i) a large number of deaths in the affected 
population; (ii) a large number of serious or long-term disabilities in the affected 
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typically have common characteristics that pose logistically complex 
governance challenges that differ from the governance of everyday 
health concerns. 
First, public health emergencies are discrete events that present 
significant threats to health that are distinct from the health challenges 
endemic to a population. As a result, mechanisms and procedures 
designed to govern the health system and to protect health in 
everyday circumstances may not be capable of handling the novel 
challenges posed by a public health emergency.39 
Second, another aspect of the discrete nature of public health 
emergencies is that they normally occur for a limited duration, at least 
in their most acute phases. The temporary nature of events like an 
influenza pandemic or a massive hurricane arguably renders them 
easier to address from a governance perspective compared with other 
ongoing and persistent governance challenges that arise in everyday 
circumstances. While the crisis may be sudden and severe, the acute 
effects (and cost) will resolve in a limited period of time, thereby 
avoiding long-term, continuous governance complications or 
obligations.40 Yet, the severity and magnitude of threats to health 
 
population; or (iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that poses 
a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large number of people in the 
affected population.  
CENTER FOR LAW AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN AND JOHNS HOPKINS 
UNIVERSITIES, MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT art. I, § 104(m) (Dec. 
21, 2001) [hereinafter MSEHPA] (alterations in original). 
39 Often health system governance and capacity is not able to handle normal health 
needs to achieve good health outcomes. There is ample evidence that the health system in 
New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina was grossly inadequate to handle the health needs 
of the population, even under nonemergency circumstances. See Evangeline (Vangy) 
Franklin, A New Kind of Medical Disaster in the United States, in THERE IS NO SUCH 
THING AS A NATURAL DISASTER: RACE, CLASS, AND HURRICANE KATRINA 185, 185–87 
(Chester Hartman & Gregory D. Squires eds., 2006). 
40 The longer-term effects of public health emergencies can also be significant, and 
raise distinct governance challenges beyond the scope of this discussion. For instance, the 
long term health effects of public health emergencies like radiation exposure from the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident, inhalation of toxic materials in the September 11, 2001, 
recovery efforts in New York, and the exposure to oil and dispersant in the Gulf of Mexico 
resulting from the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill will not be known for many 
years. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-1068T, HEALTH EFFECTS IN 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACK 7–15, 20–23 (2004) 
(describing the health effects which were observed in the aftermath of the World Trade 
Center attack and the efforts undertaken by various entities to monitor and understand 
those health effects); Linda A. McCauley, Environments and Health: Will the BP Oil Spill 
Affect Our Health?, 110 AM. J. NURSING 54, 54–56 (2010) (discussing how experts 
examine the potential short- and long-term effects of the BP oil spill); Health Effects of the 
Chernobyl Accident: An Overview, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 2006), http://www.who 
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created by these catastrophes and the strenuous impact they place on 
the health system may, to the contrary, increase the complexity of 
governance challenges, particularly in the short term. Severe damage 
to key parts of the governance infrastructure, such as the wholesale 
destruction of communications capability during Hurricane Katrina41 
or the decimation of physical infrastructure that followed the 2010 
earthquake in Port-au-Prince, Haiti,42 heightens systemic stress until 
damaged or dysfunctional systems can be repaired or circumvented. 
Third, public health emergencies may require rapid and sometimes 
extraordinary responses based upon the sudden and significant threats 
to health and well-being, as well as other factors, created by such 
emergencies.43 These factors have a particular relevance to questions 
of governance since the need for expeditious and efficient actions 
may inform the appropriate governance options under the 
circumstances.44 
Fourth, public health emergencies arise at times and in ways that 
may be difficult or even impossible to predict with specificity, 
although it is often possible to foresee the general types of public 
 
.int/ionizing_radiation/chernobyl/backgrounder/en/index.html (reporting, twenty years 
after the accident, the nature of the long-term health effects); NAT’L INST. ENVTL. HEALTH 
SCI., GULF STUDY, http://www.niehs.nih.gov/about/od/programs/gulfspill/gulfstudy/index 
.cfm (last updated Oct. 3, 2012) (ongoing study on the long-term health effects of the BP 
oil spill). 
41 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 37, 55–56. 
42 See ELIZABETH FERRIS & DANIEL PETZ, THE BROOKINGS INST. – LONDON SCH. OF 
ECON., A Year of Living Dangerously: A Review of Natural Disasters in 2010 44–45 
(2011) (discussing how the government was almost completely paralyzed in the days 
immediately following the disaster; “26,000 civil servants are estimated to have perished, 
government ministries and agency headquarters were destroyed, there were major 
communications difficulties,” and many government employees were too traumatized to 
fulfill their responsibilities). 
43 Indeed, the MSEHPA definition of public health highlights the severity of the health 
risk as integral to the definition of “public health emergency” in that it must pose 
[A] high probability of any of the following harms: (i) a large number of deaths 
in the affected population; (ii) a large number of serious or long-term disabilities 
in the affected population; or (iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic 
agent that poses a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large number of 
people in the affected population. 
MSEHPA, supra note 38, at art. I, § 104(m). See also ON RISK AND DISASTER, supra note 
11, at 8. 
44 While the threats to health may indeed be extraordinary during a public health 
emergency, the question of whether public health emergencies justify extraordinary legal 
powers has raised considerable debate. See infra note 81, on the debate over extraordinary 
legal powers for public health emergency response. 
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health emergencies that might arise. Scientists know the locations 
where hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes are likely to occur, if not 
the exact timing and magnitude. These variables are quite important, 
since a disaster that strikes with unanticipated severity or in an 
unexpected location can overwhelm even well-designed systems.45 
Application of advanced technologies such as disease surveillance, 
epidemiology, weather tracking, and seismology,46 have increased the 
likelihood of anticipating these threats in advance, but this does not 
alleviate the potential for unexpected threats to materialize. This 
reality suggests that governance planning should take into account 
likely public health emergency scenarios and build in adaptability to 
respond to less likely emergency circumstances. 
The terrible destruction wreaked by Hurricane Katrina on Gulf 
Coast communities exemplifies all four of these characteristics of 
public health emergencies. The storm itself, one of the strongest on 
record in the Gulf of Mexico, created a distinct threat to the health of 
those living in communities in its path. The duration of the storm was 
brief, but the aftermath of the storm and subsequent flooding in New 
Orleans interrupted normal functions of government, the health 
system, and other key infrastructure, resulting in short-term health 
and governance challenges. A storm of this magnitude, location, and 
likely consequences was not only predictable, it was effectively 
predicted in a training exercise held only a year prior to the real 
storm.47 Therefore, the inability of the formal emergency response 
 
45 See Arnold M. Howitt & Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard, Katrina and the Core 
Challenges of Disaster Response, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 215, 216–17 (2006) 
(noting that Hurricane Katrina was distinct from other “routine” emergencies due to its 
novelty of scale and location), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site 
/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/programs/crisis-leadership/katrina_core 
_challenges.pdf. 
46 See Zhengzhang Chen et al., Discovery of Extreme Events-Related Communities in 
Contrasting Groups of Physical System Networks, DATA MINING AND KNOWLEDGE 
DISCOVERY, Aug. 6, 2012 (outlining a new predictive model for forecasting hurricanes 
and large rainfalls); L. Knopoff, Earthquake Prediction: The Scientific Challenge, 93 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 3719 (1996) (outlining the difficulties facing earthquake 
prediction efforts). 
47 In 2004, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Louisiana began 
a series of meetings to develop a detailed response plan for a catastrophic hurricane. 
Participating federal, state, and local staff responded to a simulated Category 3 hurricane 
named Pam in order to develop strategies for predeployment, search and rescue, shelter 
and temporary housing, commodity distribution, and public information, among other 
functions. Insufficient funding precluded the completion of the meetings. Although the 
Hurricane Pam efforts were only partially complete when Hurricane Katrina made 
landfall, they still had a positive impact. See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 25; see 
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infrastructure to adequately respond was baffling and inexcusable. 
Finally, Hurricane Katrina did require an extraordinary response, due 
to the unprecedented impact inflicted by the storm on affected areas. 
As described below, a number of systemic and operational 
deficiencies in the governance of the storm undermined the response 
and had negative health consequences. 
A fifth characteristic of public health emergencies is that they 
come in many varieties, and therefore preparedness and response 
efforts must be adaptable. Preparing for a myriad of possible threats 
presents a daunting task and may stress the functioning of relevant 
legal and practical systems. Public health emergencies can arise from 
biological or environmental factors and may be instigated by 
intentional acts, technological failures, or unintentional “natural” 
events. Biologically-based threats (SARS, H1N1 influenza) may 
produce substantial mortality, possibly killing millions worldwide.48 
Environmental factors that threaten health, such as hurricanes and 
floods, have become stronger, more frequent, and more damaging, 
and have incurred widespread loss of life.49 The nature of causation 
 
also PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA, supra note 4, at 123–30 (discussing methods for 
better preparedness). 
48 Estimates of potential influenza pandemic mortality vary. Compare Christopher J.L. 
Murray et al., Estimation of potential global pandemic influenza mortality on the basis of 
vital registry data from the 1918–20 pandemic: a quantitative analysis, 368 LANCET 2211, 
2211 (2006) (estimating that an influenza pandemic with similar virulence to the 1918 
influenza pandemic could cause sixty-two million deaths worldwide, most in developing 
countries), with PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON U.S. PREPARATIONS FOR 2009-H1N1 INFLUENZA viii 
(2009) (presenting a model scenario with mortality rates between 30,000 and 90,000 
people from the 2009 H1N1 novel influenza in the United States). See also Declan Butler, 
How severe will the flu outbreak be?, NATURE, May 2009, at 14, 14–15 (quoting several 
influenza experts on the inherent uncertainty in the morbidity and mortality caused by a 
novel influenza strain); FluView: A Weekly Influenza Surveillance Report, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly (last updated Oct. 
26, 2012) (providing recent H1N1 data and showing that in 2009 and 2010, there were 282 
influenza-related pediatric deaths. Compare to 133 deaths in year 2008 and 2009 and 122 
deaths in year 2010 and 2011). 
49 See, e.g., ELIZABETH FERRIS, THE BROOKINGS INST., NATURAL DISASTER 
RESPONSE IN JAPAN AND FIJI 1 (2011) (noting that the Japan earthquake and subsequent 
tsunami destroyed 120,000 buildings, caused more than $300 billion in economic 
damages, and left more than 20,000 people dead); Eric Stover & Patrick Vinck, Cyclone 
Nargis and the Politics of Relief and Reconstruction Aid in Burma (Myanmar), 300 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 729, 729–30 (2008) (discussing how the unwillingness of the government in 
Myanmar to accept external assistance after Cyclone Nargis exacerbated the toll exacted 
by the storm); Adam B. Ellick, Floods Could Have Lasting Impact for Pakistan, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/world/asia/17pstan.html 
GABLE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2012  8:39 AM 
394 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 375 
of the public health emergency may affect the governance of both 
preparedness and response activities. Intentionally caused 
emergencies may implicate national security and the criminal law 
system, while technological failures may give rise to tort claims. This 
variation in causes, causation, risks, and effects of public health 
emergencies further adds to the complexity of emergency response, 
since the relevant systems must be sufficiently flexible and adaptable 
to respond to such a variety of challenges. Table 1 provides examples 
of public health emergencies. 
Table 1. Examples of events within the primary categories of public health 
emergencies 
 Biological Factors Environmental Factors 
Intentional 
Causation 
 Smallpox release 
 Weaponized 
   anthrax release 
 Dirty bomb 
   detonation 
 Sarin Gas attack 
 Mass casualty 
   terrorist attack 
 Nuclear detonation 
Technological 
Failure 
 Accidental release 
   of infectious agent 
 Deep water drilling 
   oil spill 
 Nuclear release after 
   tsunami flooding 
Unintentional 
Causation 
 Pandemic Influenza 
 SARS 
 
 Natural disasters 
 Hurricanes 
 Floods 
 Earthquakes 
2. Legal Complexity in Public Health Emergency Governance 
A myriad of legal frameworks potentially apply to public health 
emergency preparedness and response. This legal complexity 
intersects with, and often exacerbates, the practical and logistical 
complexities that permeate public health emergencies. Law plays a 
vital role in the governance of public health emergencies. It 
establishes the powers and infrastructures that have had the most 
influence on how emergencies are governed. It legitimizes actions by 
 
?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (outlining the devastation caused by the 2010 flooding throughout 
Pakistan). 
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government officials and also constrains the conduct of these 
officials. Further, it sets the rules for how nongovernmental entities—
from nonprofit organizations, to private corporations, to volunteers—
may participate in governance, as well as holding all participants 
responsible for their conduct.50 
Public health emergency governance is marked by the confluence 
of several discrete strands of legal authority, only some of which are 
directly targeted at resolving emergency circumstances. Emergency 
responses engender the convergence of legal powers related to public 
health, emergency response, and national security. Emergency 
responses further implicate legal concerns as disparate as employment 
law,51 environmental law,52 and the regulation of different areas of 
healthcare practice.53 This complicated legal landscape can add 
complexity and confusion to efforts to respond to emergencies.54 
 
50 See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far are 
Limitations on Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105, 1132–
34 (2003) [hereinafter Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health] (discussing the major 
legal powers necessary to respond to a public health emergency). 
51 See Hunter, supra note 32, at 114–17 (urging for job protection, income replacement, 
and healthcare access for those subjected to mandatory quarantine); Mark A. Rothstein & 
Meghan K. Talbott, Job Security and Income Replacement for Individuals in Quarantine: 
The Need for Legislation, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 239, 251–52, 255–56 (2007) 
(proposing job security and income replacement for individuals under quarantine orders). 
52 See, e.g., William C. Nicholson, Legal Issues in Emergency Response to Terrorism 
Incidents Involving Hazardous Materials: The Hazardous Waste Operations and 
Emergency Response (“HAZWOPER”) Standard, Standard Operating Procedures, 
Mutual Aid and the Incident Management System, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 295, 331–36 
(2003) (analyzing the legal implications of emergency response involving hazardous 
materials); Victoria Sutton, Environment and Public Health in a Time of Plague, 30 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 217, 224–33 (2004) (examining public health law and environmental law in a 
post-September 11 environment); Julia C. Webb, Responsible Response: Do the 
Emergency and Major Disaster Exceptions to Federal Environmental Laws Make Sense 
from a Restoration and Mitigation Perspective?, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. POL’Y REV. 
529, 555–66 (2007) (noting the environmental laws implicated by emergency response to 
hurricanes and the effectiveness of those laws). 
53 See James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Risk Management in the Wake of Hurricanes and 
Other Disasters: Hospital Civil Liability Arising from the Use of Volunteer Health 
Professionals During Emergencies, 10 MICH. ST. UNIV. J. MED. & L. 57 (2006) (noting 
the necessity and effects of volunteer health professionals, and how hospitals must make 
adjustments to accommodate them). 
54 Another metric of the extent of this legal complexity is that the Department of 
Homeland Security’s list of “legal authorities that guide the structure, development, and 
implementation of the National Response Framework,” which is the key federal 
emergency response plan, includes sixty-three statutes and regulations, seventeen 
presidential executive orders, and twenty other presidential directives. DEP’T OF 
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Even a cursory review of the statutes, regulations, and other legal 
materials that form the legal framework for public health emergency 
response reveals the tangled architecture of relevant laws, which exist 
at federal, state, and local levels, and often overlap in their application 
and interpretation. Existing legal infrastructure places the nexus of 
emergency response at the local and state level, with federal officials 
only intervening once the state requests assistance or the 
circumstances reach a sufficient level of severity. 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (Stafford Act) represents the cornerstone of federal law related to 
emergency management,55 and epitomizes this local-first approach. 
Primarily a funding mechanism, the Stafford Act authorizes the 
President to declare an “emergency” or “major disaster” at the request 
of state officials or, in rare cases, without such a request. Once one of 
these declarations has been made, the federal government may 
provide resources including financial, material, and logistical support 
through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).56 
Federal law provides for several other mechanisms to enact 
emergency response efforts. The National Emergencies Act57 
provides the President with authority to declare a “national 
emergency” without a specific state request.58 This declaration 
activates any special or extraordinary powers that Congress has 
previously authorized the President to use.59 The Posse Comitatus 
Act, by contrast, prohibits federal troops from being deployed for 
domestic law enforcement purposes, which limits their role during 
emergencies.60 Efforts initiated after Hurricane Katrina to expand the 
role of military personnel during emergencies have been 
unsuccessful.61 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK: LIST OF AUTHORITIES AND 
REFERENCES (2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-authorities.pdf. 
55 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
5121–5207 (2006). 
56 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5191. 
57 National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651 (2006). 
58 50 U.S.C. § 1621. 
59 Id. 
60 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006). See also Michael Greenberger, Did 
the Founding Fathers Do “A Heckuva Job”? Constitutional Authorization for the Use of 
Federal Troops to Prevent the Loss of a Major American City, 87 B.U. L. REV. 397, 406–
14 (2007) (discussing the scope and application of the Posse Comitatus Act).  
61 A short-lived amendment to the Insurrection Act, would have explicitly authorized 
the use of military personnel during a “natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public 
health emergency.” Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1956), amended by John Warner 
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Federal law further divides emergency preparedness and response 
efforts across multiple agencies. The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) has become the primary federal agency for 
emergency management, housing FEMA and overseeing the National 
Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management 
System (NIMS).62 The NRF and NIMS are detailed emergency 
response plans designed to coordinate planning for emergency 
preparedness and response, although these documents do not 
themselves have the authority of law.63 
Emergency powers more focused on the health aspects of 
emergencies are found elsewhere in federal law. The Public Health 
Service Act provides for the Secretary of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) to declare a public health emergency.64 
This provision, which focuses on financial support but could be used 
to justify more direct government intervention, has been invoked most 
recently in response to the outbreak of novel H1N1 influenza in 
2009.65 The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 
expands the role of HHS in responding to and providing oversight for 
public health emergencies.66 Recognizing that expertise in health can 
 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 
1076(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2404 (2006). This provision was repealed in 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-
181, § 1068(a)(1), 122 Stat. 325 (2008). 
62 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), issued by the President in 
2003, required DHS to develop the NRF and NIMS. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., 110TH 
CONG., COMPILATION OF HOMELAND SEC. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES 23, 26 (Comm. 
Print 2008). 
63 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
(2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf [hereinafter NIMS]; 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (2008), http://www.fema 
.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf [hereinafter NRF]. 
64 “Public health emergency” is defined as follows: 
If the Secretary determines, after consultation with such public health officials as 
may be necessary, that 
(1) a disease or disorder presents a public health emergency; or 
(2) a public health emergency, including significant outbreaks of infectious 
diseases or bioterrorist attacks, otherwise exists. 
42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2006). 
65 Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH HUM. 
SERVICES (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/phe_swh1n1.html. 
66 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 
2831 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also James G. Hodge, 
Jr. et al., The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act: Improving Public Health 
Emergency Response, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1708, 1708–10 (2007) [hereinafter Hodge, 
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act] (analyzing the major legal changes 
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be vital to certain types of emergencies, the Act designates the 
Secretary of HHS as the lead federal official under the NRF for public 
health emergencies.67 The Public Readiness and Emergency 
Preparedness Act (PREP Act) provides targeted liability protections 
for anyone involved in designing, manufacturing, distributing, or 
selling a medical countermeasure that has been designated by the 
Secretary of HHS to be vital to public health.68 This Act provides 
widespread immunity to those involved with these countermeasures in 
order to incentivize their production.69 
State emergency health powers coexist with this federal legal 
infrastructure, and in many ways are more substantial than federal 
powers since state powers are grounded in the state’s inherent police 
powers.70 All states have enacted legislation that permits state 
government, and in many cases local government as well, to act in 
response to emergencies.71 States permit the declaration of an 
“emergency” or “disaster,” or in some cases both, which changes the 
legal landscape relevant to emergency response and permits greater 
authority to respond rapidly.72 State level legislation or executive 
orders may enact emergency preparedness plans, authorize the 
deployment of state resources, and waive licensing requirements and 
other regulations.73 These legal provisions also may empower state 
officials to evacuate affected areas, shutter schools or public events, 
and restrict movement of individuals, consistent with constitutional 
due process limitations.74 Emergency management officials at the 
state or local level implement these powers on behalf of the 
 
implemented in the Act). The role of the Secretary of HHS under these circumstances is 
further delineated in Emergency Support Function #8 (ESF-8), an annex to the NRF. See 
generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES SECURITY, EMERGENCY SUPPORT 
FUNCTION #8–PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES ANNEX (2008), http://www.fema 
.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-08.pdf. 
67 42 U.S.C. § 300hh. 
68 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a). 
69 Id. 
70 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824); see GOSTIN, Power, Duty, Restraint, supra 
note 24, at 94. 
71 See Hodge et al., supra note 13, at 26–28 (describing the scope of state emergency 
powers). 
72 James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal Triage 
During Public Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249, 263–65 (2008). 
73 Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning 
for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 622, 623–25 (2002) [hereinafter Gostin, MSEHPA] (describing state 
emergency powers). 
74 Id. at 626–27. 
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governor.75 While state law varies considerably across the country, 
many states have enacted additional legislation that specifically 
authorizes public health officials to respond to public health 
emergencies. The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act 
(MSEHPA), drafted in 2001, has had a strong influence on the legal 
regimes in many of these states.76 Finally, the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) has been enacted by all 
fifty states, and allows for resource sharing between states during 
times of declared emergencies.77 
In sum, many of the most relevant legislative and policy reform 
efforts related to public health emergency preparedness, such as the 
MSEHPA at the state level, modifications to the NRF and NIMS at 
the national level, and the International Health Regulations at the 
international level, were premised on creating better systemic 
frameworks for public health emergency governance through more 
detailed processes and more competent and responsive 
infrastructures.78 
The influence of law on the governance of public health 
emergencies goes beyond the structural framework it provides. It also 
presents a venue for articulating and legitimizing the normative 
aspects of emergency preparedness and response. Laws may establish 
and codify norms of conduct and cooperation, as well as setting the 
overall goals to be sought through public health emergency 
 
75 See Hodge et al., supra note 13, at 26–29 (describing the effects of state emergency 
powers declarations). 
76 A recent assessment concluded that forty-one states and Washington, D.C. have 
enacted some components of this model act into their state laws. NETWORK FOR PUB. 
HEALTH LAW, THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT: SUMMARY 
MATRIX (June 2012) (on file with author). 
77 Emergency Management Assistance Compact, H.R.J. Res. 193, 104th Cong. (1996). 
78 See Gostin, MSEHPA, supra note 73, at 625–26 (describing the MSEHPA and the 
impetus behind the CDC’s request to draft these model state programs); Naim Kapucu, 
Interorganizational Coordination in Complex Environments of Disasters: The Evolution of 
Intergovernmental Disaster Response Systems, 6 J. HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY 
MGMT. (2009) (evaluating the changes from the Federal Response Plan to the NRF); 
Rebecca Katz, Use of Revised International Health Regulations during Influenza A 
(H1N1) Epidemic, 2009, 15 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1165, 1165 (2009) 
(concluding that there is “the need for sound international health agreements and . . . all 
nations [need] to implement these agreements to the best of their abilities”); Benjamin 
Mason Meier et al., Modernizing State Public Health Enabling Statutes to Reflect the 
Mission and Essential Services of Public Health, 15 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRAC. 112 
(2009) (study measuring the effectiveness of the Turning Point Model State Public Health 
Act in assisting states to develop their individual state plans). 
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preparedness and response efforts.79 To the extent that these 
established norms differ across different aspects of the applicable law, 
confusion, inconsistency, and injustice may result. 
The impact of law on the enterprise of governance, however, must 
be viewed in the larger context of the entire system involved in public 
health emergency response. Many other factors and actors are 
involved in emergency governance outside those formally established 
by the legal infrastructure. Nongovernmental actors, such as nonprofit 
organizations, private corporations, including hospitals and 
pharmaceutical companies, and volunteers, may play key roles in 
providing services and support during a public health emergency, yet 
these roles may not be formally recognized by the emergency 
response infrastructure.80 Complicating this calculus, these actors are 
regulated and influenced by a wider set of laws, social traditions, and 
economic factors that exert control and pressure on their actions. 
Thus, while it can be said that law is the most influential factor in 
governing a public health emergency, numerous other factors 
measurably affect governance as well. 
Using a governance paradigm is useful given the increasing 
complexity of public health emergencies, the unusually high risk to 
health, and the need for sudden response efforts. Yet many of the 
contentious debates surrounding reform of public health emergency 
powers have adopted a narrower focus, mostly gravitating toward 
discussions about the appropriate level of authority and discretion that 
the government should wield in its emergency response efforts.81 One 
 
79 See generally Lance Gable, The Proliferation of Human Rights in Global Health 
Governance, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 534 (2007) (explaining the relationship between 
structural and normative aspects of human rights law). 
80 See Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13, at 10. 
81 A vehement debate has swirled around the issue of whether the law should allow 
extraordinary public health emergency powers at all. Compare Gostin, Public Health Law 
in an Age of Terrorism, supra note 12, 86–91 (defending the use of emergency legal 
powers in the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act), with George J. Annas, Blinded 
by Bioterrorism: Public Health and Liberty in the 21st Century, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 33, 
45–54 (2003) (criticizing the Model Act for providing insufficient legal protections for due 
process). On the related question of whether limited public health resources should be used 
for public health emergency preparedness, see CENTURY FOUND., ARE BIOTERRORISM 
DOLLARS MAKING US SAFER? (Jan. 12, 2005), http://tcf.org /media-center/2005/pr44 
(Recommendation 6 states, “[a] balance must be struck between preparing for a biological 
attack and maintaining and expanding other vital functions of the public health system.”). 
Secondarily, if the law does allow such powers, there is a debate over what their normative 
content should be, and to what extent these powers need to be constrained to avoid 
mistakes, abuse, or other negative consequences. See Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens 
Health, supra note 50, at 1159–69 (setting out detailed philosophical arguments supporting 
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advantage of the governance paradigm is that it moves beyond that 
debate; not because it is unimportant, but because it has crowded out 
other timely and consequential discussions about the effects of law 
within broader governance models and how these laws influence 
outcomes during a public health emergency response. 
C. Governance Failures During Public Health Emergencies 
History suggests that governance failures can undermine efforts to 
respond to public health emergencies and indeed exacerbate the 
severity of these emergencies and their impacts on health. Emergency 
responses prone to governance failure commonly exhibit traits of 
novelty, magnitude, or surprise, such as the outbreak of a novel 
disease, an earthquake in an area not known for seismic activity, or a 
hurricane of unusual strength, like Hurricane Katrina. The significant 
consequences of governance failure during public health emergencies 
necessitate that these failures be taken seriously and their causes 
addressed. 
It is important to note that governance failures during emergency 
responses are the exception rather than the norm. Despite the 
logistical and legal complexity of public health emergency 
governance, responses to many events that qualify as public health 
emergencies occur without significant negative impacts on the health 
of the population. A few recent examples demonstrate this point. 
When severe flooding threatened several cities in North Dakota in 
2009, and again in 2011, rapid response efforts by federal, state, and 
local governments and members of the affected communities avoided 
a more serious catastrophe.82 Hurricane responses to less serious 
storms than Hurricane Katrina have been executed extremely well 
with support from all levels of government and private sector 
 
extraordinary emergency health powers and discussing the normative content of these 
powers); see, e.g., James F. Childress & Ruth Gaare Bernheim, Beyond the Liberal and 
Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and Vision for Public Health, 55 FLA. L. REV. 
1191 (2003) (critiquing the MSEHPA); Wendy E. Parmet, Liberalism, Communitarianism, 
and Public Health: Comments on Lawrence O. Gostin’s Lecture, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1221 
(2003) (same); Bruce Jennings, On Authority and Justification in Public Health, 55 FLA. 
L. REV. 1241 (2003) (same); TROTTER, supra note 16, at 51–52 (same). 
82 The response efforts to these two floods used a variety of governmental and 
nongovernmental resources from FEMA, applied NIMS and Incident Command Structure, 
state National Guard, Medical Reserve Corps, Red Cross, and other nonprofit and 
volunteer assistance. See N.D. Nat’l Guard, North Dakota Flood 2011 Fact Sheet, NAT’L 
GUARD (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.nationalguard.com/news/2011/apr/11/north-dakota      
-flood-2011-fact-sheet. 
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partners.83 The opening of the Morganza Spillway locks on the 
Mississippi River during 2011 floods prevented large-scale flooding 
in several major cities.84 The rapid efforts to forestall a major 
influenza pandemic in 2009 and 2010 were arguably helpful in 
minimizing the spread of the disease and reducing morbidity and 
mortality.85 These emergency response efforts and many others 
suggest that, in many cases, the emergency response system functions 
relatively effectively. Determining good governance outcomes 
presents a different challenge. It is often quite difficult to set goals ex 
ante given the prevalence of uncertainty and to assess whether the 
best outcome has indeed occurred ex post. 
Nevertheless, logistical and legal complexity raises the potential 
for system failure when factors coalesce in ways that strain the design 
and operation of the response system. When such failures occur, the 
results can be catastrophic. System failure in this context refers to the 
inability of the system to adequately function as designed and to 
achieve its goals, namely to respond efficiently and mitigate harms to 
health and property, among other concerns. Hurricane Katrina 
provides the emblematic example of such a system-wide failure. The 
problems encountered with the Hurricane Katrina response were 
myriad, but can be grouped according to two types of system failure: 
(1) systemic design deficiencies built into the emergency response 
infrastructure and (2) operational deficiencies in the implementation 
of emergency response plans and tools. Improving governance of 
public health emergency response requires addressing both types of 
system failure. 
1. Systemic Design Deficiencies 
Systemic design deficiencies in emergency response governance 
occur as a byproduct of poorly designed or inflexible preparedness 
and response systems. Inadequate design in the emergency 
preparedness and response system arises from the logistical and legal 
 
83 See MITCHELL L. MOSS & CHARLES SHELHAMER, CENTER FOR CATASTROPHE 
PREPARATION & RESPONSE, THE STAFFORD ACT: PRIORITIES FOR REFORM 8 (2007) 
(noting that for the ten-year period between 1996 and 2006, FEMA responded to 151 
emergencies and 597 major disasters); see also DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFF. OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-09-78, Management Advisory Report: FEMA’s Response to 
Hurricane Ike 1–6 (June 2009) (finding that FEMA and its federal and state partners 
responded effectively to the disaster). 
84 Campbell Robertson, Louisiana Spillway Opened to Relieve Flooding, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/us/15spillway.html?_r=0. 
85 See Gable et al., supra note 5. 
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complexity of the system, as well as the historical, piecemeal 
development of different components of the system. As the previous 
section suggests, applicable law creates a veritable morass of 
intersecting authorities relevant to emergency response, cutting across 
jurisdictional boundaries, multiple agencies, and both public and 
private entities. Coupled with the need to address emergencies of 
unexpected scope and composition, this multivariate emergency 
response system raises concerns in several areas, including 
federalism-based confusion over which jurisdictional entity is in 
charge, overlapping authority between different government agencies, 
legal uncertainty for nongovernment responders, and reliance on a 
government-controlled, linear response system. 
Federalism and perceived systemic constraints. A significant 
concern with the design of the emergency response system stems 
from the division of legal powers across federal, state, and local 
governments.86 Generally speaking, the emergency response system 
creates a hierarchical framework that places responsibility for 
emergency response in the hands of local officials. Depending on the 
severity of the circumstances and the capabilities of the local 
jurisdiction, mechanisms exist to enlist the support of state 
government and then the federal government at the request of state 
officials.87 This aptly named “‘pull’ system of intergovernmental 
relief” allows the local government to “pull” resources from the state 
and federal governments when their own supplies have been 
extinguished or overwhelmed.88 The converse approach, which 
allows the federal government to “push” resources on the local 
governments in a time of national crisis or catastrophe, is only 
 
86 Debates about federalism have advanced the persistent question of whether public 
health emergency powers should be situated at the federal, state, or local levels. Some 
scholars have supported maintaining legal powers at the state and local levels of 
government during a public health emergency. See Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of 
Terrorism, supra note 12, at 86–87 (addressing the federalism debate and supporting state-
based emergency powers). This approach promotes consistency with the normal 
jurisdictional arrangement for public health powers, recognizes the importance of local 
knowledge regarding public health needs, and ensures that responders and decision makers 
alike are personally invested in the outcome in the community. See James G. Hodge, Jr., 
The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 338–57 
(1997–98). Further, this model mirrors the infrastructure set forward in emergency 
management statutes, which also begin with state-centered decision making. 
87 Saundra Schneider, Who’s to Blame? (Mis) Perceptions of the Intergovernmental 
Response to Disasters, 38 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 715, 716–18 (2008) (discussing the 
intergovernmental disaster response infrastructure). 
88 Id. at 718–19. 
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permitted under very limited circumstances.89 The roots of such a 
model for emergency response grow from the federalist tradition that 
seeks to balance state and federal powers.90 
The federal Stafford Act leaves much decision-making authority 
with the state government, introducing federalism-based constraints 
that can deter rapid action by the federal government without state 
sanction.91 Indeed, during Hurricane Katrina, federalism concerns 
slowed federal action for several days, as federal, state, and local 
officials debated the appropriate roles and authorities of each 
government entity to respond, resulting in delayed response and 
rescue efforts and increased suffering and loss of life.92 
Dual declarations and parallel lines of authority. A second 
potential concern arises from the distribution of emergency response 
powers across different government agencies within a particular 
jurisdiction. The presence of overlapping legal provisions can lead to 
the “dual declaration” problem.93 Many state governments have 
distinct departments responsible for public health and emergency 
management functions.94 States also often have distinct legislation 
dealing with disaster response, raising the concern that multiple 
concurrent declarations may be enacted during an emergency. During 
public heath emergencies, these agencies may have conflicting 
mandates and overlapping legal authority to engage in response 
efforts.95 States have worked to harmonize and resolve these potential 
conflicts, but many aspects of state infrastructure remain distinct 
despite their interconnected roles.96 The responsibilities and authority 
allocated to each department may not be sufficiently clear, which 
could lead to power struggles, blame shifting, hesitation, or difficulty 
in cross-agency coordination. 
Legal deterrents for nongovernmental entities to participate in 
response efforts. The role of nongovernmental actors, such as private 
sector health care providers, nonprofit organizations, suppliers, and 
 
89 Joe Whitley et al., Homeland Security After Hurricane Katrina: Where Do We Go 
From Here?, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 4 (2006). 
90 Elizabeth F. Kent, “Where’s the Calvary?” Federal Response to 21st Century 
Disasters, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 181, 185–86 (2006). 
91 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
5121–5207, 5191–5192 (2006). 
92 See Ryan, supra note 11, at 522. 
93 See Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13, at 28–29. 
94 Id. at 22–29. 
95 Id. at 28–29. 
96 Id. 
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volunteers, is integral to an effective emergency response. Often these 
participants provide valuable assistance to those affected by the 
emergency. Numerous state and federal legal provisions apply to 
these potential participants, and the law may encourage or limit the 
activities of these nongovernmental actors in their response efforts.97 
Law can be structured to facilitate participation of these actors, for 
example, by allowing license reciprocity for healthcare volunteers 
from other states or extending workers’ compensation coverage to 
these volunteers, as is provided by EMAC and some state emergency 
laws.98 However, where these provisions are not in place, the legal 
landscape may deter participation by some of these actors who may 
be concerned about liability and other legal consequences of their 
participation. 
Reliance on a government-controlled, linear response system. Most 
emergency response and public health emergency powers take a 
linear approach to emergency response with government ensconced as 
the central actor.99 Actions in the system are predicated on 
government decisions and are largely driven by government efforts. 
This approach envisions a strong government role in conducting and 
coordinating efforts to implement emergency preparedness and 
response. Linear models of governance often take on the 
characteristics of stringent, hierarchical infrastructures, with chains of 
command and exercise of control by those at the top of the command 
structure. This type of model is not limited to a specific level of 
government or a specific type of agency within the government. 
Rather, top-down, command-and-control approaches to governance 
can exist at any level of government. 
2. Operational Deficiencies 
Operational deficiencies present an altogether different set of 
governance concerns during public health emergencies. Instead of the 
system design itself being the problem, operational deficiencies arise 
when different components or participants in the system fail to 
execute the system as designed, leading to negative results. 
Operational deficiencies typically occur in two types of 
circumstances: when the nature of the emergency overwhelms the 
 
97 See id. at 20–21, 46–58. 
98 Id. at 48–52. 
99 See infra Part III.A for a more detailed description of this traditional governance 
approach. 
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capacity of the system to operate, or when key individuals make poor 
decisions that undermine the functioning of the system. 
Overwhelming or unexpected impact. If the emergency 
circumstances are catastrophic and overwhelm the capacity of the 
system to respond or even function, operational failure can result. For 
example, during Hurricane Katrina, when local governments had their 
capability to formally request state and federal assistance destroyed 
by the wrath of the storm, the rigid formal request mechanism 
impeded the functioning of the system and delayed needed 
assistance.100 National planning has recognized that supply or 
personnel shortages during a severe pandemic could create scarcity 
that would affect the standards of care available to those seeking 
health services.101 Indeed, specific medicine shortages and inability to 
evacuate led to the deaths of many hospitalized patients in the days 
after Hurricane Katrina.102 The 2010 earthquake in Haiti presents yet 
another compelling example. The magnitude of the earthquake and its 
location, together with the weak physical infrastructure of buildings in 
Port-au-Prince, undermined the operation of virtually every aspect of 
society and necessitated substantial external assistance.103 
Poor decision making. The infrastructure of emergency response 
relies primarily on a limited number of individual decision makers to 
make key assessments and control the government response effort. In 
most emergency preparedness and response systems, the decisions of 
individuals have a great impact on health and other outcomes. Often 
legal provisions complicate this decision-making process. In early 
emergency preparedness tabletop exercises, the most glaring failure 
was the poor performance of integral decision makers.104 Legal 
powers were insufficient, or sufficiently vague, in ways that 
 
100 See Ryan, supra note 11, at 522–23. 
101 INST. OF MED., GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE FOR 
USE IN DISASTER SITUATIONS: A LETTER REPORT 13–15 (2009), http://www.iom.edu 
/~/media/Files/Report Files/2009/DisasterCareStandards/Standards of Care report brief 
FINAL.pdf. 
102 See BRADFORD H. GRAY & KATHY HEBERT, THE URBAN INST., HOSPITALS IN 
HURRICANE KATRINA: CHALLENGES FACING CUSTODIAL INSTITUTIONS IN A DISASTER 
3–4, 7 (2006), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411348_katrinahospitals.pdf. 
103 See FERRIS & PETZ, supra note 42, at 5 (noting that the Haiti earthquake killed over 
316,000 Haitians, injured over 300,000 people, displaced more than 1.8 million people, 
and caused some $8 billion in damages). 
104 See Thomas V. Inglesby et al., A Plague on Your City: Observations from 
TOPOFF, 32 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 436, 439–43 (2001); Tara O’Toole et al., 
Shining Light on “Dark Winter,” 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 972, 979–82 (2002). 
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complicated understandings of law and undermined rapid response.105 
Poor performance by decision makers resulted in negative outcomes, 
and in some cases, the entire emergency response systems were 
derailed.106 
This problem has been effectuated in real emergency responses as 
well, most notably Hurricane Katrina, in which many of the 
designated decision makers performed poorly. The slow response and 
poor decisions made at all levels of government during Hurricane 
Katrina greatly exacerbated the toll of the storm on life and health.107 
Resources from the federal level were delayed for days while officials 
waited to deploy assets through FEMA and Disaster Medical 
Assistance Teams.108 Political considerations also affected decision 
making, with Louisiana Governor Blanco refusing to release state-
based National Guard members to participate in the federal 
response.109 Whether poor decision making emanates from ineptitude, 
maliciousness, fear, or merely a wrong guess about consequences, the 
concentration of powers granted to specific individuals under existing 
emergency response laws and policies is a potential problem during 
any emergency response. 
3. Interconnected Deficiencies in Public Health Emergency 
Governance 
The above examples raise significant systemic design and 
operational concerns. When both systemic design and operational 
deficiencies arise within the emergency response system, they are 
often intertwined and inextricable. If the emergency response system 
cannot function when its linear and centralized structure is disrupted, 
then it can easily fail during large or unexpected disasters, as indeed it 
did during Hurricane Katrina. Thus, even where logistical and legal 
 
105 In the TOPOFF exercises the decision-making officials were uninformed, often 
acting in ways that defied scientific understandings of disease epidemiology and 
constitutional powers. Inglesby et al., supra note 104, at 439–43; O’Toole et al., supra 
note 104, at 979–82. 
106 See Inglesby et al., supra note 104, at 443–44. 
107 See Kim Elliott, Public Health Preparedness in the 21st Century, 58 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 595, 604 (2006) (describing the command-and-control approach as one of the 
downfalls to Hurricane Katrina’s inadequate response). 
108 See MCQUAID & SCHLEIFSTEIN, supra note 11, at 231–36 (detailing delay in the 
deployment of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams after Hurricane Katrina). 
109 Ryan, supra note 11, at 528–32. 
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infrastructures are well designed, the translation of legal powers to 
good governance is not assured. 
Legal approaches to public health emergencies presuppose a linear 
relationship between legal powers granted to the government, the 
proper execution of those powers, and the resultant beneficial effect 
on health, which occurs as a consequence of this competent 
execution. This causal presumption does not accurately reflect the 
reality of how law is used in practice, especially in the often-
convoluted setting of a public health emergency. The linear flow of 
this narrative may be disrupted by the complexity of the situation, the 
multitude of participants who have influence over the potential 
outcome of the situation, and the inherent limitations on the ability of 
a legal infrastructure to adequately address—and govern—all of these 
variables. 
The Hurricane Katrina response again illustrates this problem 
explicitly: while legal powers and emergency response frameworks to 
enact more rapid response efforts existed on the books, they were not 
used effectively.110 The National Response Plan (NRP) enacted by 
the federal government in 2004 to coordinate responses to “Incidents 
of National Significance” did not provide sufficient guidance for 
determining whether an event qualified as an Incident of National 
Significance, neglected to include procedures for invoking the NRP, 
and failed to detail the actions to be taken under the NRP.111 
The disconnect between legal powers and implementation is not 
limited to Hurricane Katrina. Poorly designed systems are a 
commonly cited problem within assessments of emergency 
governance. For example, early public health emergency tabletop 
exercises identified numerous systemic deficiencies in emergency 
response governance.112 These failures revealed that systems that are 
not resilient enough to survive a bad decision maker should be 
redesigned to enhance their resilience and to have the capacity to 
respond to predictable failures. 
 
110 See PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA , supra note 11, at 23 (noting that during the 
Katrina response, there were several significant departures from the NRP protocols). 
111 See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 13–15. 
112 The first bioterrorism “table top” exercises, known as “TOPOFF” and “Dark 
Winter,” preceded the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These exercises challenged 
actual government officials playing roles with hypothetical emergency scenarios of a 
plague outbreak and smallpox outbreak, and confirmed that emergency preparedness 
infrastructure was insufficiently developed. See Inglesby et al., supra note 104, at 437–43; 
O’Toole et al., supra note 104, at 976–83. 
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II 
MODELS OF GOVERNANCE: APPLYING CONCEPTIONS OF 
GOVERNANCE TO PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
The discussion above identifies numerous significant governance 
problems in the current emergency response system in the United 
States. Applying governance theory to public health emergencies can 
help resolve these problems and develop a better system. Governance 
theory seeks to explain shifting approaches and innovations in law, 
policy, and regulation. Discussions of governance theory also have 
fostered the process of developing alternative governance models to 
account for increasingly complex societal conditions.113 
Alternative governance models may provide a means to circumvent 
components of traditional governance models that render them 
ineffective, susceptible to breakdown, myopic, or otherwise 
suboptimal in practical applications. Indeed, the response to 
Hurricane Katrina epitomized each of these problems with traditional 
governance models. Therefore, the field of public health emergency 
preparedness and response, with its inherent complexity and recent 
history of systemic failures, presents a ripe target for the application 
of alternative approaches to governance. 
Theories of governance have benefitted from the influx and cross-
fertilization of ideas from a variety of disciplines, bringing together 
insights from law, political science, history, philosophy, systems 
theory, and other social sciences. The resulting scholarship is an 
interesting, but often impenetrable, array of ideas that challenge—or 
in some cases defend—the regulatory status quo and commonly held 
understandings of how events and behavior are managed and 
influenced within complex systems.114 
 
113 Governance theory has captured the interest of scholars and policy makers in recent 
years, yielding a robust scholarly literature on governance that has proliferated to explore a 
wide range of approaches. See generally Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative 
Governance in Theory and Practice, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 543 (2007); 
Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, supra note 18 (reviewing the 
development of governance scholarship); Hunter, supra note 32, at 91 (discussing three 
types of governance theory in relation to public health: dominant state authority, 
public/private administrative governance models, and governmentality). In addition, a 
specialized journal has been created to examine the interplay between regulation and 
governance, appropriately titled REGULATION & GOVERNANCE. See Braithwaite et al., 
supra note 18, at 1 (introducing the new journal and explaining its priorities and interests). 
114 Critiques of government regulation and the rigidity of top-down governance 
approaches have a long intellectual history, but the level of interest in this topic has 
expanded over the past two decades. See Burris, Changes in Governance, supra note 19, at 
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public health emergencies through law and policy reform. Most 
importantly, the governance approaches used under these models are 
not inherently contradictory; rather, they can coexist and complement 
each other since each model has distinct strengths and weaknesses in 
the context of public health emergency response. This realization 
supports the development of an integrated pluralistic governance 
approach, outlined in Part IV of the Article, which supports and 
applies these governance models simultaneously. Integrated 
pluralistic governance allows governance models to reinforce each 
other and create a more resilient, redundant, and adaptable public 
health emergency response system that is more likely to avoid 
systemic design or operational failures. 
A. Traditional Governance Models 
1. Understanding Traditional Governance Models 
Traditional governance models typically involve government 
actors using direct legal authority to control events or actions. These 
models are grounded on the centralized, command-and-control 
governance systems that have evolved and predominated since the 
rise of the regulatory state in the United States.115 As such, traditional 
models of governance employ a hierarchical structure with formal 
rules and regulatory authority vested in government agencies and 
officials.116 The “traditional” label for this model reflects not only its 
widespread adoption, but also its well-established position as the 
default approach for governance. 
Under traditional governance models for public health 
emergencies, legislation and regulations dictate the amount of control 
and specific substantive authority granted to the government, the 
method by which emergency powers are allocated, and the inherent 
and explicit limitations placed upon these powers by the law.117 
Emergency response laws at the federal level (e.g., Stafford Act, 
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act) and the state level (e.g., 
state emergency response laws, EMAC) fit within traditional models 
of governance, since they prioritize government control of response 
 
115 See Christopher K. Leman, Direct Government, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A 
GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 48, 49–53 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). 
116 Id. 
117 See MSEHPA, supra note 38, arts. IV–VI, §§ 401–608 (outlining state emergency 
public health powers in legislative language). 
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efforts and centralize coordination of response activities. Emergency 
response plans such as the NRF and NIMS similarly outline the 
government role in response efforts through the traditional 
governance model. The Incident Command System, which forms the 
backbone of these response plans, adopts a prototypical command-
and-control governance model. 
The level of centralization found in traditional governance models 
will vary somewhat depending on whether the legal framework that 
outlines the emergency governance structure consolidates authority 
within a single government agency or whether authority is distributed 
across governmental institutions. Likewise, the amount of 
centralization will differ based on whether legal authority exists at the 
federal, state, or local level, with federally-based legal authority being 
the most centralized and locally-based authority the least centralized 
under typical circumstances. The level of control and centralization 
may be affected by whether the governance policies were developed 
at a single moment or piecemeal over a long period of time. 
Nevertheless, traditional governance models exhibit high levels of 
both government control and centralization, regardless of these 
specific variations.118 Figure 2 depicts traditional governance models 
along the continua of government control and centralization. 
  
 
118 State and local governments can exhibit high centralization since the emergency 
response efforts being coordinated by that government entity will be centralized at the 
state or local level. By contrast, alternative governance models would adopt more 
decentralized approaches with nongovernmental actors more actively involved in 
governance. 
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where public health powers generally and emergency powers 
specifically have been jurisdictionally or structurally decentralized, 
the command-and-control model remains the favored approach. Thus, 
state and local officials frequently follow a strict internal hierarchy 
when engaged in emergency preparedness and response efforts.122 
The role of the federal government in the governance of public 
health emergencies has gradually increased over the past sixty 
years,123 but the state-centric model has been retained through the 
Stafford Act.124 The Stafford Act reinforces the primary role of state 
and local resources and the supplementary nature of federal 
support.125 This form of federalism in disaster response has been and 
continues to be the preferred model. Functionally, since state and 
local governments take the lead in emergency response, this approach 
decentralizes decision making and authority to the local levels. 
However, conflicts over control and coordination can occur in 
systems that distribute emergency response powers across different 
government agencies within a particular jurisdiction. States have 
worked to harmonize and resolve these potential conflicts, but many 
aspects of state infrastructure remain decentralized to an extent.126 
While federal and state disaster response plans have consistently been 
civilian programs, many of their structural aspects build upon well-
established military regulations and practices, including the Incident 
Command System.127 These systems take a relatively rigid 
hierarchical approach to organizing and coordinating an emergency 
response. 
The passage of several pieces of legislation has solidified a more 
active and responsive federal role in public health emergency 
 
threatens public health, not just in circumstances that meet the criteria for public health 
emergencies. See GOSTIN, POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT, supra note 24, at 371–76, 437–45 
(describing public health powers for infectious disease control). 
122 See NIMS, supra note 63, at 45–63 (detailing the Incident Command System for 
state and local governments to apply during emergency responses). 
123 See MOSS & SHELHAMER, supra note 83, at 10–13 (providing a detailed description 
of the history and gradual evolution of federal law and policy related to disaster response). 
124 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
5121–5207 (2006) (building on prior emergency management legislation beginning with 
the Civil Defense Act of 1950). 
125 42 U.S.C. § 5195. 
126 See Hodge & Anderson, supra note 72, at 269–71 (discussing state efforts to adapt 
to changing legal environments through coordination during public health emergencies).  
127 See MISKEL, supra note 13, at 8–10 (describing the key military operational features 
that have been incorporated into federal emergency response systems); NIMS, supra note 
63, at 45–63 (describing the Incident Command System). 
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governance. The creation of DHS by the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 represented an effort to centralize and strengthen federal 
government authority in emergency response systems.128 The most 
important components of federal response infrastructure—FEMA, 
NRF, and NIMS—are controlled by DHS.129 The NRF and NIMS 
seek to establish a comprehensive and consistent national plan that is 
intended to affect public health emergency governance at all 
jurisdictional levels, and therefore represent a significant expansion in 
coordinated planning for emergency preparedness and response.130 
The NRF and NIMS comprise, in some ways, the most hierarchical 
components of the emergency response system in the United 
States.131 They reiterate a command-and-control approach and a 
preference for local-level control.132 Two of the six intended goals of 
the NRP (the predecessor of the NRF that was in place during 
Hurricane Katrina) and NIMS, to “incorporate emergency 
management and law enforcement into a single structure” and 
“provide one way of operating for all events,” exemplify the limiting 
one-size-fits-all mentality engrained in a command-and-control 
structure.133 
 
128 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as 
amended at 6 U.S.C. §§ 101–613). 
129 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) issued by the President in 
2003, required DHS to develop the NRF and NIMS. See COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., 
supra note 60, at 23, 26; NIMS, supra note 63, at 8; NRF, supra note 63, at 6. 
130 NIMS, supra note 63, at 11–16; NRF, supra note 63, at 7–12. Notably, the Stafford 
Act, National Emergencies Act, DHS, FEMA, NRF, and NIMS adopt the all-hazards 
approach. In theory, this approach covers all types of emergencies including public health 
emergencies. Yet most declarations made under the Stafford Act arise from emergencies 
or disasters caused by environmental factors. According to FEMA’s disaster search 
engine, only four incidents have ever warranted an emergency or disaster declaration on 
the basis of a “virus threat.” See Disaster Declarations, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov 
/news/disasters.fema (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). The search engine allows targeted 
research for declarations of major disaster and emergency by state, region, or disaster type. 
Id.  
131 Although, in other respects, they adopt New Governance models. See discussion 
infra Part III.B. 
132 NRF, supra note 63, at 10 (“Incidents must be managed at the lowest possible 
jurisdictional level . . . .”); see also NIMS, supra note 63, at 12 (“A basic premise of both 
NIMS and the NRF is that incidents typically be managed at the local level first.”). 
133 John R. Harrald, Agility and Discipline: Critical Success Factors for Disaster 
Response, 604 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCI. 256, 267 (2006); see 
also Lobel, supra note 18, at 379 (“A central critique of the old regulatory model is its 
one-size-fits-all approach.”). 
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The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 
established an expanded role for HHS in responding to public health 
emergencies.134 The Act extends federal oversight over the public 
health emergency response system in several ways. First, the Act 
designates the Secretary of HHS as the lead federal official under the 
NRP for public health emergencies.135 This approach breaks with the 
typical practice of having DHS officials fill this role, and thus the 
provision recognizes the importance of having health professionals 
guide response efforts during a public health emergency.136 The Act 
asserts federal control over a number of emergency response 
programs that had previously been under state and local control.137 
Further, the Act requires the coordination of the National Disaster 
Medical System,138 compels measurement of emergency 
preparedness benchmarks at the state and local levels,139 and provides 
incentives and infrastructure for the development of medical 
countermeasures to combat biological threats.140 Taken together, 
these provisions represent a transition to much more extensive federal 
involvement in the governance of public health emergencies, although 
it remains to be seen what practical effects will come from this 
legislation. 
State governments retain most of the legal authority to conduct 
public health activities through their inherent police powers. Police 
powers also authorize emergency management efforts. Yet in most 
states, as in the federal government, the agencies responsible for 
public health and emergency management are separate.141 Until 
recently, the public health community, including state and local 
government health officials, was not involved in public health 
emergency preparedness or response efforts coordinated by 
government emergency managers. The legal landscape did not 
 
134 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 
Stat. 2831 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Hodge, 
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, supra note 66, at 1708–10 (analyzing the 
major legal changes implemented in this Act). 
135 42 U.S.C. § 300hh. 
136 See Hodge, Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, supra note 66, at 1708. 
137 42 U.S.C. §§ 300hh-2, 300hh-15. 
138 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-10. 
139 42 U.S.C. § 247d-3a. 
140 42 U.S.C. § 247d-7e. 
141 See Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13, at 28–29. 
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habitually recognize a public health emergency, and where such 
provisions did exist, they were often inadequate.142 
Law reform efforts related to state-level public health emergency 
powers began in earnest in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks and the release of anthrax spores via mail in October 
2001. The Center for Law and the Public’s Health spearheaded the 
initiative to draft a model state law that would clarify, modernize, and 
enhance the public health emergency powers available to state 
officials. The resulting model law, the Model State Emergency Health 
Powers Act (MSEHPA), offered a state-centered model, which 
augmented the existing powers of state officials in their efforts to 
prepare for and respond to public health emergencies.143 
The MSEHPA provides a powerful state-level example of 
traditional governance, although one that incorporates some New 
Governance ideas in various places.144 The MSEHPA preconditions a 
declaration of public health emergency and the subsequent 
augmentation of legal powers on the declaration of the state 
governor.145 The declaration authorizes a number of specific powers 
to be used as appropriate by government officials and places authority 
in the hands of government public health officials.146 Although it 
represents prototypical top-down governance, the approach taken by 
the MSEHPA has been justified as an effort to efficiently respond to 
urgent and extraordinary threats.147 Additionally, by placing public 
health officials in the position of governing authority, the MSEHPA 
recognizes the importance of public health expertise in governing 
officials. The federal Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
later adopted the same approach, designating the Secretary of HHS as 
the lead official under the NRP during a declared public health 
emergency.148 In practice, the MSEHPA had a significant effect on 
the legal landscape across the country. Many states have introduced 
and passed bills incorporating sections of the MSEHPA, and its 
 
142 See Gostin, MSEHPA, supra note 73, at 623–24 (describing the deficiencies of 
existing state emergency laws). 
143 See MSEHPA, supra note 38; see also Gostin, MSEHPA, supra note 73, at 625–26 
(outlining the major provisions of the MSEHPA). 
144 See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
145 MSEHPA, supra note 38, art. IV, § 401. 
146 Id. 
147 See Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health, supra note 50, at 1161–68; see also 
infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing public health emergency governance complexities). 
148 42 U.S.C. § 300hh(a) (2006). 
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widespread adoption has brought more consistency to state-level 
public health emergency powers in the United States.149 
The MSEHPA immediately generated a substantial amount of 
commentary and controversy, much of it grounded in the archetypical 
concerns usually raised over traditional governance models. Even 
though the drafters of the Act strenuously made the case that 
procedural protections and limitations had been included to check the 
power of government,150 critics were wary of the Act due to its 
perceived expansion of government power.151 Critics of public health 
emergency law reform initiatives additionally cited the increasing 
connection of public health emergencies with national security efforts 
as particularly troubling.152 However, the interaction of public health 
and emergency management has to occur at some level in order to 
respond effectively to the health threats raised in a public health 
emergency, despite the clash of cultures and legal authorities.153 
EMAC, the interstate agreement that permits states to share and 
request assistance during emergencies, also adopts some aspects of 
traditional governance models. States are the primary actors under the 
compact, and the liability and workers’ compensation protections 
 
149 See MSEHPA, supra note 38; CENTER FOR LAW AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH AT 
GEORGETOWN AND JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITIES, MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH 
POWERS ACT: STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY (2006), http://www.publichealthlaw.net 
/MSEHPA/MSEHPA%20Leg%20Activity.pdf (containing the list of states that have 
passed the MSEHPA legislation along with legislation numbers and differences). 
150 See Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health, supra note 50, at 1161–68. 
151 See supra note 81 (providing a detailed description of this debate). 
152 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 32, at 96 (suggesting that “the conceptual model for 
public health emergency response situations is also moving in subtle ways toward a 
national security or quasi-military norm”). But see MISKEL, supra note 13, at 39–56 
(detailing the history of military involvement in emergency response and outlining the 
positive contributions of this model). 
153 Some organizations have been eager to push the linkage between emergency 
management and public health at the state level. See State Strategies for Fully Integrating 
Public Health into Homeland Security, NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES (Nov. 27, 2005) 
(advocating incorporation of public health into the state homeland security governance 
structure). On the issue of collaboration between public health and law enforcement, see 
Jay C. Butler et al., Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New 
Paradigms and Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response, 8 EMERGING 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1152, 1154–55 (2002) (detailing collaboration issues that arose 
during the anthrax investigation in 2001); Victor W. Sidel et al., Good Intentions and the 
Road to Bioterrorism Preparedness, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 716, 717 (2001) (finding 
such cooperation to be “destructive to public health efforts”). 
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provided to incentivize resource and personnel sharing only apply to 
government officials.154 
B. “New Governance” Models 
1. Understanding New Governance Models 
A second category of governance theories explicitly 
recontextualizes governance as a multiparticipant endeavor, with 
governmental and nongovernmental actors sharing responsibility and 
influence.155 These theories, collectively referred to as “New 
Governance” models, identify more decentralized approaches to 
governance that are more participatory, adaptable, and reflexive.156 
New Governance models emphasize ideas based on flexible, 
collaborative partnerships rather than established top-down, rights-
based strategies integral to traditional governance models.157 “New” 
does not mean contemporary; rather it refers to the “widespread and 
explicit use of nonconventional forms of governing.”158 New 
Governance models have been applied in practice primarily to areas 
of administrative and environmental law and have had a strong 
influence on understanding modern regulation in both the United 
States159 and the European Union.160 
 
154 See Emergency Management Assistance Compact, H.R.J. Res. 193, 104th Cong. 
(1996). 
155 See, e.g., Black, Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, supra note 21, at 140 (identifying 
five central notions of decentered regulation: complexity, fragmentation, 
interdependencies, ungovernability, and rejection of a clear public/private distinction); 
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 4–7 (1997); Christine Parker, The Pluralization of Regulation, 9 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 349, 352–55 (2008) (examining the normative argument for legal pluralism 
in regulation). 
156 See Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An 
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1, 1–
14 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002); Lobel, supra note 18, at 344.  
157 Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 324–25 
(2009). 
158 Trubek, supra note 34, at 147–48. 
159 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 18, at 344 (summarizing New Governance approaches 
in the United States); Salamon, supra note 156, at 1–14 (defining the New Governance 
paradigm). 
160 See David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: 
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 544–48 
(2006). New Governance theories have been influential in the European Union. For 
example, under the terms of the EU Treaty there are “common objectives to ‘ensure 
sustained convergence of the economic performances of Member States.’” Caroline de la 
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Conceptually, New Governance incorporates and overlaps with 
strands of other legal theories including negotiated governance, legal 
pragmatism, and democratic experimentalism.161 New Governance 
models encompass a wide range of methods and policy 
alternatives.162 Some of these models focus primarily on distributing 
control to entities other than the government, through methods such 
as public/private partnerships, negotiated rulemaking, audited self-
regulation, and performance-based rules.163 Other approaches under 
these models hinge on moving governance away from the centralized 
government decision maker through decentralized and dynamic 
problem solving.164 Still other models seek to expand participation 
and transparency through disclosure regimes and coordinated 
information collection.165 New Governance scholarship further 
emphasizes such tenets as the collaborative process and a “flexible 
policy [of] formation, implementation, and monitoring.”166 The 
common characteristics of these methods center on their intent to 
bring nongovernmental actors into the governance process to 
encourage power sharing, broader dialogue, and ultimately better 
 
Porte & Philippe Pochet, Social Benchmarking, Policy Making and New Governance in 
the EU, 11 J. EUR. SOC. POL’Y  291, 295 (2001). The Open Method of Communication 
(“OMC”) is intended to include all relevant stakeholders, such as the Union, the member 
states, and social partners. Id. at 292–93. The OMC is a form of New Governance because 
it relies on peer pressure as a means of enforcement: benchmarking to compare “how an 
organization is doing relative to its peers.” Id. at 292; see also Graínne De Búrca & Joanne 
Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW 
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 1, 1–14 (Graínne De Búrca & Joanne Scott, eds., 
2006) (assessing the expansion of New Governance theories). 
161 See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 
119, at 314–23 (1998) (developing a theory of democratic experimentalism based on 
decentralization of government and the development of information pooling, 
public/private coordination, and mutual learning); Solomon, supra note 114, at 821–37 
(reviewing the New Governance literature); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist 
Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 296, 312–20 (2000) (outlining a non-
essentialist theory of legal pluralism). 
162 Some commentators view New Governance as a cohesive paradigm, which 
incorporates emerging trends in legal thinking about constitutional and administrative law, 
jurisprudence, and democratic theory. See Lobel, supra note 18, at 345–48. Others have 
described New Governance as a collection of disparate approaches with a similar 
conceptual grounding. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, “New Governance” in 
Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 471, 478–79 (2004). 
163 See Lobel, supra note 18, at 345. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 NeJaime, supra note 157, at 332 (the author outlines five general tenets of New 
Governance theory by referencing work by other scholars). 
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governance outcomes. Supporters of these approaches hail their 
democratizing effects,167 but critics have noted that New Governance 
models may actually permit more consolidation of influence by 
sophisticated participants in the process.168 
New Governance models vary in scope and content, but they 
generally are more decentralized than traditional conceptions of 
governance and may involve numerous disparate actors from the 
public and private sectors in collaborative engagement and 
discourse.169 Thus, these models exist conceptually between 
traditional command-and-control models and models that support 
more radical deregulation and privatization of governance functions. 
As a consequence, the available methods and tools of governance 
under this approach are more varied and the possibilities for 
innovation more plentiful. New Governance models also tend to be 
less oriented towards government control. By distributing authority 
within the governance structure, these models change the power 
dynamics in the relationship between public and private actors. New 
Governance offers the potential, therefore, for the pluralization of 
laws and systems, governance methodologies, and the actors and 
institutions involved in governance. 
Much of the recent interest in New Governance models is framed 
as a critique of so-called “traditional” models of governance.170 Key 
to these critiques is an underlying assumption that government has 
failed to deliver on its regulatory promises either because of poor 
execution or because the complexity of modern society has made 
successful regulation impossible.171 These persistent critiques have 
provided fertile ground for alternative governance theories that 
feature less governmental control and less centralization in 
governance design. But these variables can be configured in many 
 
167 See Lobel, supra note 18, at 405–06 (Table 2 notes the beneficial adjustments of 
moving from regulation to New Governance models). 
168 See Karkkainen, supra note 162, at 486 (challenging Table 2 of Lobel directly); id. 
at 480 (noting the broad debates among scholars as to the nature of New Governance and 
its successes). 
169 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 18, at 372–76 (describing partnership and participation 
in New Governance theory); Salamon, supra note 156, at 14–15 (noting changes in 
governance participants). 
170 Lobel, supra note 18, at 377 (“[T]he regulatory model promotes adversarial 
relations, mutual distrust, and conflict.”). 
171 Salamon, supra note 156, at 6–9 (outlining the need for a New Governance 
paradigm). 
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voice in emergency planning and response.172 Moreover, the use of 
New Governance models in public health emergency response has 
expanded in recent years, often in reaction to the inflexibility and 
inconsistency of traditional governance models. For example, in the 
aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina debacle, commentators criticized 
both the command-and-control structure of the NRP and the 
implementation of the plan.173 Federal authorities subsequently 
revised the NRF and NIMS to provide a more flexible 
infrastructure.174 Interestingly, despite its claim to address criticism 
that its previous iteration was “insufficiently national in its focus,” 
the revised NRF explicitly reduces hierarchy in its system, 
eliminating the need for a federal level declaration of an “Incident of 
National Significance” to trigger the framework.175 The revised NRF 
further includes information about the role of nongovernmental 
organizations and private sector entities in emergency response 
efforts.176 
A number of New Governance principles have been utilized in 
efforts to govern public health emergencies.177 Fostering inclusive 
partnerships, participation, and collaboration are central to the New 
Governance model. These ideas have a long informal history in 
emergency preparedness and response. New Governance emphasizes 
the power of “non-governmental stakeholders to formulate . . . [new] 
goals and directives that [will] shape regulatory reform.”178 More 
specifically, this means structuring systems to allow for greater 
collaboration between public and private entities in the planning, 
response, mitigation, and recovery phases of emergency response. 
 
172 See NIMS, supra note 63, at 6–7; NRF, supra note 63, at 8–12. 
173 See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 52–54; see generally Ryan, supra note 11 
(critiquing the federalism constraints that undermined the Hurricane Katrina response). 
174 See NIMS, supra note 63, at 6–7; NRF, supra note 63, at 8–12. 
175 NRF, supra note 63, at 2, 8. 
176 NRF, supra note 63, at 6–7, 18–21. 
177 Professor Orly Lobel, in her detailed theoretical discussion of New Governance 
theory, identifies eight organizing principles of New Governance: (1) participation and 
partnership; (2) collaboration; (3) diversity and competition; (4) decentralization and 
subsidiarity; (5) integration of policy domains; (6) flexibility and noncoerciveness; (7) 
fallibility, adaptability, and dynamic learning; and (8) law as competence and 
orchestration. Lobel, supra note 18, at 371–404 (discussing these principles of New 
Governance in detail). 
178 Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons From 
Chicago’s Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 117, 
120 (2009) (analyzing New Governance literature in the context of Chicago’s urban 
housing reform process). 
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While “[t]raditional governance has been skeptical of collaborations 
between private and public entities,” New Governance models tout 
several advantages of public/private collaboration.179 Collaboration 
goes a step beyond participation and seeks to include individuals as 
“norm-generating subjects” within the governance infrastructure.180 
In other words, this approach allows nongovernmental entities like 
private health institutions, volunteers, nonprofit organizations, and 
civil society groups to have direct and indirect input into planning, 
goal setting, and even perhaps the functional response efforts in a 
coordinated way. 
The principles of diversity, competition, decentralization, and 
subsidiarity181 have relevance to public health emergencies as well. 
Concepts of diversity and competition have a minor role in the 
contracting process for certain emergency services, but when it comes 
to emergency response, government plans specifically avoid 
competing efforts.182 Yet it is clear from the results of some recent 
emergency responses (in particular the Hurricane Katrina response 
due to its large impact) that a diverse contingent of responders, 
including medical volunteers in some cases, is needed.183 Finding 
appropriate personnel requires drawing on available expertise from 
across a variety of communities and from members of the private 
sector. 
Until recently, explicit efforts to include nongovernmental actors in 
planning efforts were rare.184 The Stafford Act does not incorporate 
nongovernmental entities into emergency response activities despite 
the fact that much of the health infrastructure in the United States is 
privately owned and operated.185 Under current federal and state law, 
 
179 Trubek, supra note 34, at 148; see also Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance 
and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1633–34 
(2001). 
180 Lobel, supra note 18, at 377. 
181 See Lobel, supra note 18, at 379–82. Subsidiarity is the concept that governance 
should take place at the lowest jurisdictional level possible before higher-level 
mechanisms are involved. See id. at 382. 
182 The MSEHPA adopts language that would allow states to use emergency powers to 
suspend regulations for conducting state business that would delay necessary action, 
including requirements for competitive bidding for state purchases. See MSEHPA, supra 
note 36, art. IV, § 402. 
183 Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13, at 13–14. 
184 But see Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 5134, 5143, 5152, 5170(b) (2006) (showing the inclusion of American Red Cross’s role 
in emergency response). 
185 See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 173 (2010). 
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governments are permitted to contract with nongovernmental entities 
to provide services during an emergency.186 This approach allows for 
participation, but is rooted in traditional governance since the 
government is merely delegating a responsibility to the contractee. 
More meaningful examples of participation, partnership, and 
collaboration are found in the NRF and NIMS, as well as in some 
state emergency legislation. These documents encourage outside 
actors to participate directly in planning and preparedness,187 which 
can allow for meaningful input into governance decisions. Partnership 
and participation by nongovernmental actors is more limited, 
however, during the course of an actual emergency, when formal 
government response predominates.188 
The role of the American Red Cross during emergencies represents 
the most well-established public/private partnership in the United 
States emergency response system. Although the American Red Cross 
is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that does not receive 
regular federal funding, it nevertheless is designated as a primary 
organization to coordinate mass care resources under Emergency 
Support Function (ESF) #6 of the NRF.189 The close relationship 
between FEMA and the American Red Cross in carrying out this 
component of the NRF provides a strong example of a New 
Governance approach. FEMA is authorized to coordinate with other 
nonprofit entities under ESF #6, but these efforts have progressed 
more slowly than many had hoped after the coordination and capacity 
shortfall during the Hurricane Katrina response.190 
Efforts to expand the health workforce have generated three 
notable examples of public/private coordination during the response 
phase of public health emergencies: the Emergency System for 
 
186 See, e.g., Michigan Emergency Management Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
30.401–.421 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.) (allowing for any action to be 
taken that is necessary to cope with an emergency); MSEHPA, supra note 38, art. II, §§ 
201–202 (containing no provision limiting the ability of states to contract with 
nongovernment service providers); NRF, supra note 63, at 30 (noting the importance and 
necessity of nongovernment contracting). 
187 MSEHPA, supra note 38, art. II, § 201. 
188 See MSEHPA, supra note 38, art. IV, § 403 (implementing emergency powers that 
give the state public health authority primary jurisdiction for planning and coordination of 
response activities). 
189 NRF, supra note 63, at 20. 
190 Tony Pipa, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, WEATHERING THE STORM: THE ROLE OF LOCAL 
NONPROFITS IN THE HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF EFFORT 10 (2006), http://www.ncg.org 
/s_ncg/assets/dpri/NSPPNonprofitsAndKatrina.pdf. 
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Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-
VHP); the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC); and the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). In effect, all three of 
these examples take a hybrid approach that combines the efforts of 
public and private actors, as well as coupling decentralized 
governance with centralized coordination—and legal support—during 
an emergency.191 
The ESAR-VHP initiative was established by state and federal 
governments to explicitly recruit potential medical volunteers for 
deployment during public health emergencies in order to fill the need 
for additional qualified medical personnel.192 ESAR-VHP directly 
reaches out to private sector volunteers and uses a variety of legal 
mechanisms to protect deployed volunteers from the legal 
ramifications of their service, including liability protection and 
workers compensation coverage.193 This system effectively marshals 
New Governance principles of collaboration, diversity, and 
decentralization to construct a useful response methodology within 
the larger infrastructure of the government response. Initially 
conceived at the state level, these systems have now been 
incorporated into the federal system. While both federal and state 
governments have made efforts to coordinate volunteer health 
professionals through the ESAR-VHP system, the participants in the 
system remain diverse in their training, skills, and employment.194 
Moreover, volunteers are decentralized in their location and 
professional affiliation, and their participation is voluntary.195 
The MRC began as a local volunteer medical services corps, also 
designed to assist during an emergency.196 This program exhibits an 
unusual combination of hierarchical and decentralized traits. Each 
MRC unit is based in a local community, draws its members from that 
community, and recruits whatever variety of experts and skills local 
 
191 Interestingly, the latest version of NIMS attempts this hybrid approach as well, 
citing its two key concepts as flexibility and standardization. See NIMS, supra note 63, at 
6–7. 
192 See HEALTH RES. & SERVICES ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
EMERGENCY SYSTEM FOR ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS–LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 9–10 (2006). 
193 Id. at 44, 53–54. 
194 Id. at 14. 
195 Id. 
196 OFFICE OF THE CIVILIAN VOLUNTEER MED. RESERVE CORP., REPORT ON THE 
MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS RESPONSE TO THE H1N1 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter MRC]. 
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participants deem relevant.197 Unlike the ESAR-VHP program, 
however, participants in the MRC are expected to undergo training 
exercises.198 In the event of an emergency, the MRC units can be 
deployed and coordinated by the federal government and receive 
federal legal protections.199 Therefore, the MRC combines aspects of 
traditional governance (a military-like hierarchy and federal 
coordination) and New Governance (decentralized recruitment, 
community-based and initiated organization, and diversity of 
personnel). MRC units performed successfully in many jurisdictions 
during the 2009 and 2010 influenza outbreak, coordinating mass 
vaccination clinics and other outreach programs in several 
jurisdictions.200 
In limited circumstances, New Governance models can emanate 
from the infrastructure of traditional governance models, creatively 
improvising new pathways to achieve public/private collaboration in 
governance. During Hurricane Katrina, several states were frustrated 
by the limitations of EMAC in facilitating resource sharing.201 
Numerous private sector healthcare personnel sought to volunteer by 
assisting in the hardest hit areas in Louisiana.202 States trying to 
coordinate assistance through EMAC were prevented by the design of 
the Compact from including volunteers that were not state employees 
because EMAC follows a traditional governance model that only 
permits sharing of state resources and personnel, and only applies 
legal protections to state officials.203 Maryland ingeniously 
circumvented this limitation in its delegation to Louisiana by 
temporarily deputizing private health care volunteers as members of 
the state guard, thereby granting them the status of state officials for 
the duration of their assistance.204 These ad hoc expansions of 
EMAC, while effective, may not provide a good governance model 
 
197 Id. at 5. 
198 Id. at 6. 
199 About the Medical Reserve Corps, MED. RES. CORPS (Aug. 8, 2012, 9:12 AM), 
https://medicalreservecorps.gov/pageViewFldr/About. 
200 MRC, supra note 196, at 7. 
201 William L. Waugh, Jr., EMAC, Katrina, and the Governors of Louisiana and 
Mississippi, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. (ISSUE SUPP.) 107, 108 (2007). 
202 Id. 
203 Emergency Management Assistance Compact, H.R.J. Res. 193, 104th Cong. (1996). 
204 Richard Colgan et al., Operation Lifeline: Health Care Professionals from 
Maryland Respond to Hurricane Katrina, ST. DEF. FORCE J., Spring 2006, at 9, 9–12, 
available at www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA496627. 
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going forward, since this approach creates uncertainty and could deter 
volunteer preparation. 
C. Diffuse Governance Models 
1. Understanding Diffuse Governance Models 
A third category of governance theories, grouped together as 
diffuse governance models, share the impetus with New Governance 
to move away from the hierarchy of traditional governance and 
conceptualize governance as a multiparty endeavor. However, these 
theories go even further from the government-centered status quo and 
suggest models of governance that radically devolve and decentralize 
governance authority and activity. These models may flatten power 
differentials and democratize participation in governance through the 
rejection of hierarchy, centralization, and power concentration. 
Diffuse governance models encompass several different theoretical 
understandings of how governance occurs or could occur. The most 
promising of these models has applied network theory to develop the 
concept of nodal governance, which recognizes multiple “nodes” 
throughout society as capable, although often uncoordinated, agents 
of governance.205 Other scholars have adapted Michel Foucault’s 
theory of governmentality to apply to governance.206 
Governmentality posits that governance is achieved through the 
exercise of power by any number of participants in society, and not 
necessarily constrained to the actions of sovereign government 
actors.207 This idea eliminates government hierarchy as the essential 
nexus of power for governance, and thereby presents a complex social 
model of interconnected power relationships. A third model of diffuse 
governance envisions anarchic governance, with multiple actors 
engaged in governance without coordination or predictability.208 
 
205 See Burris, Nodal Governance, supra note 35, at 33. 
206 See Gunther Teubner, Introduction to Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A 
NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1, 1 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988) (describing a 
model of reflexive law that accounts for other social institutions); Burris, Changes in 
Governance, supra note 19, at 8 n.10 (providing background on the evolution of 
conception of governance); Hunter, supra note 32, at 118–20 (applying governmentality 
theory to public health). 
207 See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN 
GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 87–104 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter THE 
FOUCAULT EFFECT]. 
208 David Fidler, A Theory of Open-Source Anarchy, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
259, 282 (2008). 
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Diffuse governance models propose a more radical break from 
traditional governance models, decoupling the inherent connection 
between governance and formal government. Given their embrace of 
innovative methodologies and reflexive understandings of legal and 
social systems, these governance approaches might legitimately be 
categorized as a subset of the New Governance theories. However, 
unlike New Governance models, which attempt to coordinate and 
systematize the relationships between public and private actors, 
diffuse governance models allow a greater degree of independence 
among participants in governance. Even where some amount of 
coordination among governance participants does occur, it may not 
use formal systems or government-moderated mechanisms. Thus, 
these conceptions of governance exhibit even less direct government 
control, hierarchy, and centralization. 
Networks and nodes. Nodal governance is a version of network 
theory where governance occurs at different points, or nodes, in a 
network.209 Building on the twin foundations of network theory and 
governmentality, nodal governance recognizes that a plethora of 
independent actors across government and civil society participate in 
governance, from government officials, to nonprofit organizations, to 
private health care facilities, to religious organizations. This model 
further situates the nexus of governance at a localized level. The 
“nodes” of governance have four characteristics: 1) an institutional 
structure, 2) mentalities or ways of thinking about governance, 3) 
technologies or methods of influencing events, and 4) resources to 
support the node and exert influence.210 These nodes interact with 
each other to form a network and to share information. Nodal 
governance emphasizes the way in which governance is directed 
towards a community.211 Information networks within a community 
produce an Outcome Generating System (OGS). This OGS is 
influenced by factors both within the “collectivity’s control” and by 
factors at a higher level of social organization.212 By focusing on the 
localized context of nodes, new and innovative efforts at governance 
can be tried, “fostering institutions of microgovernance.”213 
 
209 See Burris, Nodal Governance, supra note 35, at 33. 
210 Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, supra note 18, at 341. 
211 See Burris, Nodal Governance, supra note 35, at 40. 
212 Id. at 36. 
213 Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, supra note 18, at 348. 
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Governmentality. Many methods of diffuse governance are 
informed by Michel Foucault’s theory of governmentality. The idea 
of governmentality proposes a much different conception of the social 
understanding of governance.214 Rather than gaining legitimacy based 
on the hierarchical position of sovereign government, Foucault sees 
governance as a process that occurs throughout all levels of society 
and that pervades the actions of individuals and institutions alike.215 
This broadens the concept of governance and delinks it from 
government actors. In essence, governmentality theory goes further in 
pluralizing governance than some of the New Governance theories, 
since rather than gaining the ability to govern through an act of 
government-instigated inclusion or deregulation, nongovernmental 
actors under Foucault’s model already participate in governance. 
Likewise, the methods of governance under this approach are more 
indirect, with the norms and rules established by various governing 
entities translated into outcomes.216 Government actors certainly still 
participate in governance under this model, but they are joined by a 
multiplicity of other potential participants in governance from 
throughout society.217 
Anarchic governance. Within a complex social system, diffuse 
governance can also be characterized as anarchic, with multiple actors 
and systems intersecting in unpredictable and uncontrollable ways. In 
many settings, the command-and-control model of governance is 
being challenged by the fact that other nongovernmental institutions 
and organizations, and new entities in the arena, are more successfully 
wielding power and influencing health policy than the traditional 
players.218 Anarchic governance can have the effect of weakening 
formal governance institutions. For instance, some global health 
scholars have observed that the World Health Organization is 
“waning” in the shadow of the wealthier Gates Foundation in the 
arena of global health.219 
The tensions caused under anarchic governance conditions may 
threaten the coherency of governance and preclude some actors in the 
system from achieving their governance goals, as these goals are co-
opted and undermined by other actors. Professor David Fidler has 
 
214 See THE FOUCAULT EFFECT, supra note 207, at 103. 
215 See id. 
216 See Hunter, supra note 32, at 103. 
217 See THE FOUCAULT EFFECT, supra note 207, at 102–03. 
218 See Burris, Changes in Governance, supra note 19, at 37. 
219 Id. 
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2. Diffuse Governance Models and Public Health Emergencies 
The nodal governance approach can help explain some of the 
disparate actions and interactions by actors and institutions involved 
in emergency response. Since nodes are broadly defined, they may be 
government officials or institutions operating at the local level (e.g., 
local health officers or FEMA representatives working on-site); 
nongovernmental organizations (e.g., the American Red Cross, 
religious organizations, volunteers); or private businesses (e.g., 
hospitals, pharmacies, supermarkets). The flexibility and complexity 
of this model incorporates many actors that influence circumstances 
during public health emergencies but may not fit within the more 
formal understandings of governance. The exertion of influence on 
the system by respective nodes may be complementary or 
contradictory. For instance, both the federal government and BP were 
important nodes of governance during the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico, but their interests in how to respond 
sometimes clashed, leading to a protracted period of response and 
cleanup where the lines of authority were blurred.223 Further, nodes 
can exert influence through formal mechanisms such as legal powers 
or through less formal means. For example, the issuance of a press 
release by the World Health Organization imposing a travel ban on 
Toronto during the SARS outbreak in 2003 had a strong governance 
effect on perceptions and behaviors of the population in ways that 
may have affected health outcomes.224 
Nodal governance models help to explain the governance 
contribution during the Hurricane Katrina response of independent 
actors whose actions greatly impacted health. When a number of 
hospitals in Louisiana flooded and lost power in the immediate 
aftermath of the storm and flooding, patients and caregivers were 
stranded without sufficient resources.225 Evacuations proceeded 
slowly, however, as many boats and helicopters were engaged 
elsewhere.226 The two hospitals that had success in achieving rapid 
evacuations were the Veterans Affairs Medical Center and Tulane 
 
223 See Osofsky, supra note 6, at 1105–06 (discussing the many fragmented and 
overlapping legal regimes involved in the BP oil spill and in the various aspects of the 
recovery process). 
224 See Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, supra note 18, at 339. 
225 James G. Hodge, Jr. & Erin Fuse Brown, Assessing Liability for Health Care 
Entities that Insufficiently Prepare for Catastrophic Emergencies, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
308, 308 (2011). 
226 Id. 
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University Hospital.227 The VA Medical Center received assistance 
from the National Guard, while Tulane was evacuated using 
helicopters rented by its parent company, HCA.228 Other public and 
private hospitals had even more difficulty evacuating patients and 
many died.229 The difference between those who received help 
quickly and those who did not was a function of the governance 
actions of these distinct nodes. In addition, other private companies 
such as Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and several national chain 
pharmacies, were integral in providing supplies to members of the 
affected populations.230 
Governmentality theory and anarchic governance also can help to 
explain some aspects of public health emergency response. 
Governmentality theory can be applied to the governance of public 
health emergencies to explain certain types of policy options. Efforts 
to implement “modern quarantine”—a series of proposals that seek to 
implement voluntary self-quarantine and other social distancing 
measures—exhibit aspects of governmentality since these proposals 
rely on social norms and obligations rather than formal legal orders to 
enforce quarantine requests.231 This type of analysis could 
conceivably be applied to a wider set of public health emergency 
 
227 See Ian L. Taylor, Hurricane Katrina’s Impact on Tulane’s Teaching Hospitals, 118 
TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL & CLIMATOLOGICAL ASS’N 69, 72–75 (2007) (describing 
the evacuation of patients at Tulane Hospital and VA Medical Center). 
228 Id. 
229 Memorial Medical Center, a hospital run by Tenet Health System, faced liability for 
their failure to prepare for a foreseeable emergency. See Susanne Pagano, Tenet Reaches 
Settlement Over Deaths at New Orleans Hospital Following Hurricane, BLOOMBERG 
LAW: HEALTH PLANS (Apr. 8, 2011) (discussing Preston v. Tenet Health System Memorial 
Medical Center Inc.); Hodge & Brown, supra note 225, at 309. 
230 See STEVEN HORWITZ, MERCATUS CTR.: GEORGE MASON UNIV., MAKING 
HURRICANE RESPONSE MORE EFFECTIVE: LESSONS FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE 
COAST GUARD DURING KATRINA 2–7 (2008) (describing the contributions of private 
sector entities in response to Hurricane Katrina); Michael D. Hogue et al., The 
Nontraditional Role of Pharmacists After Hurricane Katrina: Process Description and 
Lessons Learned, PUB. HEALTH REP., Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 218–21 (discussing the novel 
roles taken on by pharmacists in response to Hurricane Katrina). 
231 See Hunter, supra note 32, at 106–09. This approach was widely employed by the 
Canadian government during the SARS outbreak in 2003, and social distancing proposals 
figure heavily in plans for pandemic influenza. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Ethical and 
Legal Challenges Posed by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Implications for the 
Control of Severe Infectious Disease Threats, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3229, 3231 (2003) 
(SARS); Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, 
and the Public’s Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 164–68 (2007) (social distancing during 
pandemic influenza). 
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proposals, including a range of other voluntary agreements and 
relationships that exist between government officials and members of 
the community. 
The perspective offered on pluralism in governance by the anarchic 
governance model highlights an important limitation on efforts to 
expand notions of governance in the public health emergency setting. 
If the multiplicity of actors, methodologies, and intersecting systems 
becomes too complex and convoluted, entities with greater power, 
influence, resources, or sophistication will reap disproportionate 
influence over governance. This may benefit their parochial interests, 
rather than the good of society overall. In the context of a public 
health emergency, when tensions are already high, care must be taken 
to avoid the undue influence of actors who would seek to undermine 
the public’s health to enrich themselves economically or politically. 
III 
INTEGRATED PLURALISTIC GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
The trio of governance models described above, and their 
respective strengths and weaknesses, present an interesting 
conundrum for policymakers seeking to improve the effectiveness and 
reliability of public health emergency response. Which of these 
models is best suited to effective emergency governance? Which of 
these models should be used, strengthened, and prioritized to reliably 
achieve good health outcomes during public health emergency 
responses? These questions are difficult to answer because public 
health emergencies vary significantly in scope, causes, and effects. 
The overwhelming consensus among most policymakers and scholars 
who have tried to answer these questions, not surprisingly, gravitates 
to traditional command-and-control governance models.232  Indeed, 
emergency planners and lawmakers should not forsake the obvious 
efficiencies of a centralized system when responding to a public 
health emergency, nor should they jettison a model that has been 
 
232 See PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA, supra note 11, at 18–65 (assessing the 
successes and failures of the Hurricane Katrina response and providing recommendations 
for improvement); LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 51–82 (providing a list of lessons 
learned from the Hurricane Katrina response and suggesting improvements to the federal 
system); Ryan, supra note 11, at 522–39 (describing the impact of federalism on the 
Hurricane Katrina response). 
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effective in responding to many recent public health emergencies.233 
However, the success of emergency response efforts should not rely 
too extensively on the proper functioning of a system so reliant on 
chains of command and official decision making. When emergency 
response mechanisms fail or degenerate into bureaucratic limbo, as 
occurred during Hurricane Katrina, there ought to be alternative 
governance choices to ensure that public health emergency responses 
do not falter. 
The sections that follow offer an innovative proposal to address 
this problem in the form of an integrated pluralistic governance 
strategy. Integrated pluralistic governance combines all three 
governance models; identifies and supports their most useful 
attributes; and uses strategies of concurrency, coordination, and 
redundancy between the models to create a more effective and 
resilient public health emergency response system. 
A. Understanding Integrated Pluralistic Governance 
Integrated pluralistic governance is grounded on the idea that the 
development and application of parallel and concurrently functional 
governance models is essential for maintaining an effective public 
health emergency response. Necessarily, and by design, an integrated 
pluralistic governance strategy incorporates redundant legal, 
structural, and operational capacities, as well as mechanisms to foster 
coordination, participation, and adaption. If successfully applied, 
integrated pluralistic governance approaches may improve the 
resilience and functioning of the public health emergency response 
system and advance the goal of achieving better health outcomes 
during public health emergencies. 
An integrated pluralistic governance strategy has three key 
advantages in this context compared with relying on a single 
governance strategy: structural adaptability, enhanced capacity, and 
redundancy. 
First, integrated pluralistic governance approaches allow for 
strategic modification of the public health emergency response system 
to select the most effectual aspects of each model of governance. All 
 
233 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-06-32, FEMA’S 
PREPAREDNESS FOR THE NEXT CATASTROPHIC DISASTER–AN UPDATE 4–6 (Sept. 2010), 
www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-123_Sep10.pdf (detailing the many annual 
disasters and emergencies that involve FEMA responses). 
GABLE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2012  8:39 AM 
436 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 375 
three governance models outlined in this Article offer workable 
approaches to governance in the context of public health emergencies. 
Current approaches to public health emergency response coexist 
across all three models of governance, as the examples provided 
above amply demonstrate.234 Additionally, the three models have 
identifiable—and distinct—strengths and weaknesses in their 
application to public health emergencies. Traditional governance 
models may be preferable to achieve efficiency, operational clarity, 
and coordination, while New Governance models or diffuse 
governance models may better advance notions of participation, 
flexibility, and adaptation. An integrated pluralistic governance 
strategy can prioritize the strengths and compensate for the 
weaknesses of each model by implementing the models 
concurrently.235 
Second, the implementation of an integrated pluralistic governance 
strategy can enhance the capacity of the overall system to respond by 
providing additional support for multisectoral development of 
expertise and accrual of skills and resources. Different governance 
models focus on the functioning of different aspects of public health 
emergency response and can be used to bolster capacity building 
across the spectrum of governance participants. For example, 
traditional governance models can strengthen and refine the actions of 
governmental officials at all jurisdictional levels. Numerous 
emergency preparedness initiatives over the past decade have pursued 
this goal, with mixed success.236 New Governance models and diffuse 
governance models, by contrast, have potential for expanding system 
response capacity in the nongovernmental sector. Establishing an 
emergency response system that has functional capacity at all levels 
of government and across both the public and private sectors would 
provide a more robust infrastructure at all of these levels, and increase 
the possibility that all areas and populations receive needed assistance 
in a timely and effective manner. Evidence suggests that substantial 
progress has been made in expanding response capacity at the federal 
and state government levels, but these gains are subject to political 
 
234 See discussion supra Part III. 
235 See infra Part IV.B. (providing a detailed examination of this issue). 
236 See Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 
Stat. 2831 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Post-Katrina 
Emergency Management Reform Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 701–811 (2006); MSEHPA, supra note 
38; NRF, supra note 63. 
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and economic factors that could endanger these advances.237 To the 
extent that better response capacity can be developed according to this 
approach, it can also more easily be shared through the coordination 
and cooperation of multiple actors. 
A third benefit of integrated pluralistic governance involves the 
potential of using parallel governance models to create redundancy, 
which will allow for emergency response efforts to continue even 
when governance failures have occurred within one or more parts of 
the system. Thus, the establishment of redundant, parallel governance 
infrastructure provides a mechanism to avoid some of the systemic 
design and operational failures that have plagued past response 
efforts.238 
This third argument for integrated pluralistic governance is fraught 
with complications, because advocating for additional systemic 
redundancy in an already complex—and expensive—system can be 
difficult to justify and politically contentious.239 Nevertheless, the 
crux of the integrated pluralistic governance strategy is to find ways 
to increase resilience in the public health emergency response system. 
Resilience is defined as “[t]he response[s] to stress at individual, 
institutional, and societal levels categorized as the characteristics that 
promote successful adaptation to adversity.”240 Most discussions of 
resilience within the emergency preparedness literature are framed in 
the context of enhancing community-level resilience, i.e., the ability 
of the community and its institutions to withstand the impact of the 
emergency and continue to function.241 However, in the broader 
 
237 See FEMA’S PREPAREDNESS FOR THE NEXT CATASTROPHIC DISASTER–AN 
UPDATE, supra note 233, at 55 (concluding that FEMA’s preparedness has improved 
across many parameters). 
238 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
239 Even funding the existing system can be politically contentious as some members in 
Congress have stated their refusal to fund FEMA recovery efforts for Hurricane Irene, 
which caused significant damage on the East Coast of the United States in August 2011, 
without corresponding budget cuts to offset these expenditures. Carl Hulse, Federal 
Austerity Changes Disaster Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2011/08/31/us/politics/31disaster.html?_r=0. 
240 SAMMANTHA L. MAGSINO,  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, APPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL 
NETWORK ANALYSIS FOR BUILDING COMMUNITY DISASTER RESILIENCE: WORKSHOP 
SUMMARY 2 (2009). 
241 See, e.g., TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, READY OR NOT?: PROTECTING THE 
PUBLIC’S HEALTH FROM DISEASES, DISASTERS, AND BIOTERRORISM 80, 96–97 (2008) 
[hereinafter TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH] (discussing the importance of community 
resilience during public health emergencies and making recommendations to bolster 
community resilience). 
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context of public health emergency governance, the concept of 
resilience can be applied to the systems—legal, medical, and social—
that participate in public health emergency responses themselves. 
Resilient systems are adaptable and persist in the face of severe 
challenges and can function despite governance failures within the 
systems. Redundancy in the application and implementation of 
governance models is a tool to achieve this systemic resilience. 
B. Assessing, Comparing, and Improving Governance Models 
The development of an integrated pluralistic governance strategy 
requires that pluralistic governance models be integrated in a way that 
maximizes the strengths and minimizes the weaknesses of each 
governance model. Public health emergency response systems already 
use many mechanisms and tools drawn from the three governance 
models previously explained. The discussion that follows assesses the 
respective strengths and weaknesses of these models in achieving 
successful public health emergency responses and in avoiding 
systemic design and operational deficiencies. Furthermore, several 
explicit recommendations for strengthening public health emergency 
governance are proposed for each model. Importantly, the systemic 
design and operational governance deficiencies that led to system 
failures during Hurricane Katrina have only been partly addressed, 
and therefore, these governance deficiencies still threaten to 
undermine future emergency response efforts and must be resolved. 
1. Improving Traditional Governance Models 
Traditional governance models prioritize government control and 
centralization of governance. The government is the primary—and in 
some cases the sole—actor effectuating governance, with other 
entities only incidentally involved in governance, if at all. This model 
can still be quite complex, due to multiple jurisdictional levels in our 
federalist system, multiple relevant actors and agencies, the need to 
comply with many applicable legal requirements, and the 
implementation of detailed, bureaucratic systems through legal and 
policy development. Yet the key parameter in traditional governance 
models remains the actions of government. The preponderance of 
recommendations coming out of the massively ineffectual Hurricane 
Katrina response, focused on changing organization or operations 
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within government systems, or shifting the authority or responsibility 
from one government official or department to another.242 
Traditional governance models comprise the clear consensus for 
governing public health emergencies, building upon a wide range of 
legal and policy provisions. Despite the widely acknowledged failures 
of this model during Hurricane Katrina, many reform proposals urged 
law- and policymakers to reinforce or refine traditional models of 
governance. For example, commentators proposed strengthening 
national powers to enhance federal control through an expanded set of 
federal powers available during large-scale emergencies or allocation 
of greater authority to military over civilian agencies.243 Many 
proposals that sought to preserve state and local preeminence in 
emergency response governance nevertheless advanced traditional 
governance models to buttress the powers of state and local 
governments to exert control over emergency response.244 
The strengths of traditional governance models seem to support 
this consensus, at least during the response phase of the emergency. 
The hierarchy and control inherent in traditional governance models 
fits well with the urgent and complex challenges posed by a public 
health emergency. Government-centered responses should be more 
efficient, coordinated, and predictable, particularly if a substantial 
government emergency preparedness infrastructure has been 
developed. Government should possess superior expertise and 
resources compared with other entities, although in the case of the 
supply chain, private entities may have superior capability in some 
circumstances.245 Further, government actions are arguably more 
 
242 See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 51–82; HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION 
STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 11, at 585–630; PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA, supra 
note 4, at 18–65. 
243 See, e.g., Harrald, supra note 133, at 261–62, 269–70 (2006) (listing critical success 
factors and proposing a balance between organization and structure on one hand and 
agility and flexibility on the other); Jason Mazzone, The Commandeerer In Chief, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 265, 295 (2007) (recommending emergency federal 
commandeering of supplies and personnel to bypass local and state governance); Kent, 
supra note 90, at 209–10 (“In times of danger and crisis, citizens need reassurance that 
someone is in charge. Citizens take comfort in trained forces leading rescue efforts. . . . 
Federalized management of catastrophes would provide a unified command structure prior 
to an event’s occurrence.”); Whitley, supra note 89, at 7 (“Under such a catastrophic 
scenario, the federal government, without being asked, must intervene more promptly in 
the immediate aftermath of an event.”). 
244 See MSEHPA, supra note 38; MISKEL, supra note 13, at 123–36 (raising a skeptical 
view of increased federal involvement in emergency response governance). 
245 See Horwitz, supra note 230, at 2–7. 
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accountable than corresponding private sector actions.246 
Predictability and consistency factor into this equation as well. 
Government control and hierarchical infrastructure are likely more 
predictable in operation than less centralized response systems, and 
the established infrastructure of traditional models forms a determined 
status quo for emergency response. Finally, law can control and shape 
government actions more readily than nongovernmental actions, 
therefore giving the law more control over the operation of traditional 
governance models. 
The traditional model has clear weaknesses as well. Proposals to 
strengthen hierarchy, augment government control, and increase 
centralization in public health emergency governance will not 
necessarily resolve the systemic design and operational failures that 
undermined the Hurricane Katrina response, and could even worsen 
these problems.247 Linear and centralized systems can be more 
susceptible to operational deficiencies, particularly those related to 
poor decision making. Government-centric traditional governance 
models may be vulnerable to political pressure during an emergency 
and political neglect between emergencies, which can lead to the 
empowerment of underqualified agency leaders, the degradation of 
operational capacity that prevents agencies from mounting an 
adequate response, or a misguided focus on the wrong threats.248 
Formal governance structures can have difficulties incorporating 
external resources and expertise, as was made frustratingly clear 
during the BP Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2010.249 
A final concern about traditional governance approaches is their 
ubiquity. If society is to rely on this governance model to respond to 
challenging and potentially deadly emergencies in a timely way, the 
 
246 Transparency requirements and democratic oversight mechanisms would support 
this argument. However, government actors often receive liability protections through 
sovereign immunity provisions that do not apply to private sector actors, which may 
render government less accountable in some instances. 
247 See MISKEL, supra note 13, at 134–36. 
248 See PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA, supra note 4, at 22 (discussing how NRCC, 
RRCC, and Emergency Response Teams all responded simultaneously to the Katrina 
disaster, rather than waiting for direction from the local level, thus causing confusion and 
inefficiency); Howitt & Leonard, supra note 45, at 220 (noting that “[i]n a crisis, as 
actions scales up and becomes more complex, leadership or certain responsibilities may 
need to be transferred from those initially in charge to others with different skills and more 
resources”). 
249 See Osofsky, supra note 6, at 1086–87 (noting how local government and sublocal 
communities engaged in their own clean-up efforts which at times conflicted with the NCP 
efforts). 
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system must be able to function even if parts of the system are 
overwhelmed or poor decisions are being made within the system that 
undermine its functionality. 
A few key recommendations may help to resolve some of the 
ongoing problems that face traditional governance models in the 
context of public health emergency response. Traditional governance 
models are best situated to resolve systemic design concerns about 
federalism and overlapping authority between agencies. The 
uncertainty surrounding roles and authority, which was so debilitating 
during Hurricane Katrina, could be addressed through more detailed 
planning and greater delineation of hierarchy through clarification of 
authorities under the Stafford Act, Pandemic Preparedness and All-
Hazards Response Act, and the NRF. Further, the development of 
more sophisticated understandings of federalism could help resolve 
confusion.250 To some extent the revisions to the NRF since 2005 
have taken good steps to address these issues in delineating more 
specific roles for federal and state agencies, designating lead agencies 
for specific types of emergencies, and creating a unified command 
structure for consistent coordination across multiple jurisdictions.251 
Had these proposals been in place during Hurricane Katrina, they 
could have eliminated some of the delays and uncertainty among 
government decision makers. Ultimately though, the impetus toward 
greater hierarchy reflected in these proposals is somewhat 
unsatisfactory because it fails to resolve operational problems 
instigated by inadequate resources or unsatisfactory decision makers. 
Even with clearer understandings in place outlining the allocation of 
authority between governments and specific agencies and better 
developed planning and hierarchy within the government emergency 
response infrastructure, the operation of the system can still fail if 
resources are not available or key decision makers perform poorly. 
2. Improving New Governance Models 
New Governance models move away from the notion that all 
governance must be done by government. Rather, multiple 
participants from the public and private sectors can and should 
participate in governance, both in the planning and development of 
 
250 See Ryan, supra note 11, at 662–65 (proposing better understandings of federalism 
in the context of emergency response). 
251 NRF, supra note 63, at 15–26. 
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governance systems and in the implementation and actualization of 
these systems. These models promote a vision of governance that 
explicitly brings these multiple parties together and shares power and 
responsibility amongst them. Efforts to bring nongovernmental actors 
into public health emergency governance, such as the NRF, ESAR-
VHP, and MRC, reflect this approach and expand the governance 
possibilities with increased variation in structure and strategy.252 
New Governance models have several strengths in the context of 
responding to public health emergencies. First and foremost these 
models recognize that both governmental and nongovernmental 
entities play important roles in response efforts, and coordination of 
their respective efforts and capacities can improve outcomes and 
mitigate harm to health.253 The inclusion of external perspectives also 
may have a democratizing effect on emergency preparedness, 
allowing for more entities to play meaningful roles and 
simultaneously enhancing the legitimacy of response efforts. 
The tendency toward decentralization and sharing of authority and 
responsibility found in New Governance models may provide some 
advantages in the context of public health emergencies as well. The 
local-first orientation of the NRF for example is predicated on the 
idea that the local community is able to prioritize and apply local 
knowledge.254 According to New Governance theories, local 
individuals and institutions, including the local government, 
hypothetically would be the best prepared to handle the safety and 
health crises that arise during a public health emergency because they 
are the most familiar with the community. The residents would also 
rely on knowledge from a variety of local individuals instead of only 
national experts. Because New Governance deemphasizes expert 
knowledge, health officials might not be given as much respect as 
well-established members of the community.255 
Two additional strengths of New Governance models may be 
linked with decentralization, collaboration, and participation: 
experimentation and ability to adapt.256 Experimentation is tied in 
with the concept of devolution because the more local the actor or 
 
252 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
253 See Hunter, supra note 32, at 116–18 (discussing the application of New 
Governance approaches to broaden participation in administrative governance of public 
health). 
254 See NeJaime, supra note 157, at 334. 
255 Lobel, supra note 18, at 453–57. 
256 Trubek, supra note 34, at 148. 
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entity the easier it is to experiment with new projects or policies.257 
The goal of experimentation in the New Governance context is to 
constantly provide the best result.258 By experimenting with problem 
solving at both the state and local levels, and in both public and 
private settings, information can be conveyed to stakeholder 
networks.259 These networks include both public entities, such as 
government officials, and private parties, such as business 
purchasers.260 In planning for a public health emergency, 
experimentation would also be key, as new policies, drills, and 
backup plans could be tested and put in place in anticipation of an 
emergency. 
Ability to adapt will be necessary when the emergency is 
unforeseen or so extensive that it creates catastrophic consequences. 
The capacity of a public health emergency system to adapt and 
respond to a new disease or a unique natural disaster that overwhelms 
conventional response efforts may be advanced through the collective 
efforts of multiple entities working together to put together an 
innovative response under the circumstances. The scalability and 
flexibility built into NRF and NIMS supports this adaptive 
capacity,261 but additional explicit capacity building outside of 
government agencies should be strongly supported and incentivized 
with financial and technical assistance. State budget cuts have 
endangered existing emergency preparedness funding and economic 
support should be increased when possible as resources become more 
available.262 
Some of these same aspects of New Governance models can be 
viewed as weaknesses in the context of responding to public health 
emergencies. Expanding the relevant participants in governance may 
complicate efforts to achieve a coordinated and efficient response. 
Additionally, decentralization during a public health emergency may 
create a serious impediment to effectuating an effective and 
 
257 Id. 
258 Id. (“Experimentation can also be seen as continuous quality improvement—
organizations should be constantly experimenting to see what works and what does not.”) 
(citing Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for 
Health Care, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 575, 587 (2002)). 
259 Id. 
260 Id. 
261 NIMS, supra note 63, at 6–7; NRF, supra note 63, at 10. 
262 Thirty-three states and Washington, D.C. cut their public health budgets in 2009 and 
2010. See TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, supra note 241, at 48. 
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coordinated response. Decentralized response efforts may face 
operational failures if the ability of the local jurisdictions or entities to 
handle the emergency response is compromised given the severity of 
the circumstances, the limited resources of the community, and the 
deleterious effect that the emergency may have already had on 
resources and health at the local level. Each of these factors played a 
role in undermining the Hurricane Katrina response.263 The ability of 
a higher level of government, or a nongovernmental response from 
outside the locality, to respond and support the local efforts would 
have been necessary to supplement response efforts under these 
circumstances. 
New Governance critics have suggested that New Governance 
models are too idealistic and fail to take into account the reality of 
social and political circumstances. New Governance theory is often 
stated in vague language that fails to deal with questions of 
implementation.264 Because New Governance theory purports to be 
an overarching regulatory theory it may not always be desirable or 
feasible in every situation.265 Another concern is that New 
Governance theory does not adequately account for inclusion of 
outside groups, particularly those that are already marginalized in 
society.266 Commentators have also raised practical questions about 
how to achieve consistency and shared values with a disparate set of 
actors involved in governance.267 These concerns are particularly 
relevant in the context of public health emergency responses, given 
the high risk to the health of the population at stake and the need for 
urgency and consistency in response efforts. 
Despite these concerns, the potential for additional initiatives using 
New Governance models is ripe for exploration. The most significant 
impact of New Governance models is most likely to be felt in the 
planning stages for public health emergencies, because this planning 
 
263 See Ryan, supra note 11, at 532–36. 
264 See Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of Learning, in LAW 
AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 323, 323–24 (Graínne De Búrca & 
Joanne Scott, eds., 2006). 
265 Sturm, supra note 264, at 360 (recognizing that while “[g]overnance techniques as a 
strategic response to a particular situation might be uncontroversial, New Governance 
presents itself as ‘an overarching regulatory theory,’ which begs difficult questions about 
desirability and feasibility”). 
266 Id. at 349–50. 
267 See NeJaime, supra note 157, at 357 (explaining that most of the New Governance 
scholarship fails to address those commitments that “featur[e] diametrically opposed views 
and constituencies”). 
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process can incorporate a more dynamic and intersectoral consultation 
process. This consultation process should explicitly include local 
perspectives and reach out to underrepresented groups who may be 
more vulnerable during public health emergencies.268 
Additionally, despite adopting a national focus and unified 
command structure, the trajectory of changes to NRF and NIMS 
suggests a move towards less centralization in response planning, a 
development consistent with New Governance models.269 With the 
implementation of NRF and NIMS continuing, private sector and 
NGO participants will have additional opportunities to become 
involved in planning.270 FEMA should expand and promote this 
process, as it likely will yield benefits in participation, training, 
capacity building, and acceptance of the norms advanced by NRF. 
The National Health Security Strategy (NHSS), a health-focused 
preparedness document prepared by the HHS, supports this initiative 
as well, with a focus on developing a strong health workforce, 
coordinated communication, and collaboration between public and 
private sectors on the issue of health during emergencies.271 Similar 
efforts should occur at the state and local levels. These partnerships, 
once in place, can form the foundation for more extensive 
collaboration in public health emergency response efforts. 
 
268 Lawrence O. Gostin, The value of public deliberation in public health preparedness, 
AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2009, at 20, 20; J. Eline Garrett et al., Listen! The Value of Public 
Engagement in Pandemic Ethics, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2009, 17, 17. 
269 Note that one of the key changes in the NRF is the switch from calling it the 
“National Response Plan” to the “National Response Framework.” NRF, supra note 63, at 
2–3. The NRF explains that in its earlier iteration “it was evident that the NRP and its 
supporting documents did not constitute a true operational plan in the sense understood by 
emergency managers. Its content was inconsistent with the promise of its title.” Id. at 2. 
The term framework “is now more accurately aligned with its intended purpose” to guide 
governmental response at all levels in partnership with the private sector, 
nongovernmental organizations, and individual citizens. Id. at 3. 
270 FEMA’S PREPAREDNESS FOR THE NEXT CATASTROPHIC DISASTER–AN UPDATE, 
supra note 233, at 4–6. 
271 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5–17 (2009), http://www.phe.gov 
/preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/Pages/default.aspx [hereinafter NHSS]; BARAK 
OBAMA, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 8: NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS (Mar. 30, 2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness; U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., BIENNIAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL 
HEALTH SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 12–53 (2010), 
www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/. . ./nhssbip-draft-100719.pdf [hereinafter Biennial 
Plan]. 
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3. Improving Diffuse Governance Models 
Diffuse governance models also seek to expand the number of 
participants in governance and reduce the reliance on government-
centered hierarchy and control of governance. The main distinction 
with diffuse governance models compared with New Governance 
models is the extent of coordination and explicit connection involved 
between entities involved in governance. Where a New Governance 
approach would bring together public and private actors to figure out 
a common strategy to respond to a public health emergency (e.g., the 
approach taken with the NRF), diffuse governance presumes that 
these public and private actors will take steps to govern, but not 
necessarily as part of a cohesive plan or coordinated process.272 
Hence, diffuse governance models often lack explicit cohesion, but 
may still be complementary in their effects and outcomes and 
consistent with the norms advanced by governmental actors. 
Critics of diffuse governance models further claim that 
decentralization lacks accountability. In addition, decentralized or 
regional governance may fail “in the absence of a regional 
identity.”273 On the other hand, even when there is state or federal 
legislation “forcing top-down regional approaches, . . . resistance to 
regionalism can undermine their effectiveness and long-term 
viability.”274 
The legal and economic deterrents that limit participation of some 
nongovernmental entities during public health emergencies can best 
be addressed through New Governance or diffuse governance models, 
supported by changes to the law to minimize those deterrents. More 
state governments could achieve this goal by enacting emergency 
response laws or otherwise introducing incentives that allow for 
licensure reciprocity for out-of-state health workers, immunity from 
liability, coverage of costs, direct compensation, workers’ 
 
272 There is another way to frame the NRF within the rubric of diffuse governance 
models. Under this approach the NRF is engaged, in part, in an exercise of coordinated 
nodal governance, with many governance participants agreeing to apply specific structural 
strategies and normative values to emergency response. There is a distinction between 
explicit coordination of nodes, in which the public and private actors agree to adhere to 
designated strategies and values, and aspirational coordination of nodes, in which the plan 
is available for all to follow—and perhaps even incentivized through legal, social, or 
economic means—but not mandatory or directly coordinated. 
273 Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 544 
(2005). 
274 Id. at 544–45. 
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compensation, or favorable access to grants or tax incentives.275 
Expansions of training programs for multiple participants can also 
empower disparate nodes in their governance efforts, while 
simultaneously advancing standardization and consistency in response 
as envisioned by NIMS.276 
The development of NHSS takes the community-based approach 
even further, stating that “[n]ational health security is built on a 
foundation of community resilience” and seeks to enhance links 
between community organizations and individuals to educate, inform, 
and incentivize preparedness.277 These types of efforts, based on 
diffuse governance models, could greatly increase response capacity 
and improve health during a public health emergency. Because their 
implementation has just begun, additional development and support 
will be vital to the success of these initiatives. 
C. Enhancing Resiliency Through Concurrency, Coordination, and 
Redundancy 
Integrated pluralistic governance offers an additional promising 
insight into addressing the problematic issue of operational 
governance failures during public health emergency responses. The 
recommendations offered in the previous section identify a series of 
proposals for enhancing governance of public health emergency 
response through each of the three governance models. What these 
recommendations do not resolve, however, are the most difficult 
questions of how to structure a public health emergency response 
system that functions well and reliably avoids systemic design and 
operational deficiencies that may lead to governance failures. Trying 
to balance efficient and effective response mechanisms, which are 
usually tethered to hierarchical traditional governance models, with 
systemic resiliency, adaptability, and innovation, which more closely 
align with New Governance models and diffuse governance models, 
creates vexing challenges. Developing a system that functions when 
faced with predictable operational governance failures—an 
overwhelmed system stretched past its capacity or a key decision-
maker not performing well—presents a difficult task. The linear 
 
275 See Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13, at 65–70 
(outlining a number of proposals to incentivize legal protections for volunteer health 
professionals during public health emergencies). 
276 See NIMS, supra note 63, at 7. 
277 BIENNIAL PLAN, supra note 271, at 7, 11–17. 
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decision-making infrastructures in place during the Hurricane Katrina 
response did not function well when presented with these two types of 
governance failures, and none of the three governance models alone 
will resolve these problems without endangering the ability of the 
system to effectively coordinate an efficient response. 
Integrated pluralistic governance, through its combination of these 
three distinct governance models, confronts the problem of 
operational governance failures by applying principles of 
concurrency, coordination, and redundancy. These are overlapping 
concepts, but each is integral to bolstering resiliency under an 
integrated pluralistic governance strategy. 
Concurrency—the simultaneous use of multiple governance 
models—does more than increase functional capacity of the 
emergency response system. Through the deployment of disparate 
parallel models, concurrency empowers a variety of governance 
actors to participate in and have complementary effects on a response 
effort. Local hospital capacity, for example, forms an important 
resource for protecting health during a public health emergency 
response.278 In governance terminology, a private hospital would 
form a node of governance under the diffuse governance model. A 
concurrent governance structure could utilize the capabilities of the 
hospital in tandem with government and other responders with 
different, but corresponding, capabilities.279 The NHSS adopts two 
objectives consistent with this notion, fostering integrated, scalable 
health systems, and developing and maintaining the health 
workforce.280 
Coordination transcends individual governance models in two 
respects. Efforts to coordinate different participants involved in public 
health emergency governance occur within and across all of the 
governance models. Additionally, the process of coordination allows 
for participants in different models to work together effectively. 
Coordination has particular relevance to New Governance models, 
which include coordination as a key principle undergirding 
 
278 Significant effort has been put into hospital preparedness across the country. The 
Hospital Preparedness Program, funded by HHS, has provided resources and guidance to 
hospitals to prepare for and respond to public health emergencies. See CTR. FOR 
BIOSECURITY OF UPMC, HOSPITALS RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 
OF THE U.S. HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM AND PRIORITIES GOING FORWARD 57–
62 (2009), http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2009/2009     
-04-16-hppreport.html. 
279 NHSS, supra note 271, at 11–12. 
280 Id. at 8–12. 
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public/private cooperation.281 Coordination can take many forms with 
various levels of cohesion and standardization. One coordination 
strategy that has been pursued by NIMS and NHSS is to encourage all 
governance participants to adhere to standard norms and plans.282 
Through standardization of practices, methods, and standards, 
different participants in governance may work efficiently and 
predictably together even when not directly in communication with 
each other. Coordination, however, need not be standardized to have 
beneficial impact. The implementation of nonstandardized approaches 
by diffuse localized governance participants could be quite useful and 
might even be essential in an emergency that defies established 
planning or requires creative innovation.283 
Redundancy plays an important role in integrated pluralistic 
governance as well. Redundancy ensures that the public health 
emergency response does not disintegrate if formal government 
systems or the hierarchical emergency response infrastructure fail. 
Redundancy is actually a form of concurrency. Whereas concurrent 
governance models coexist and include multiple participants with 
distinct roles and capabilities, redundancy strives to create coexisting 
capacity that explicitly does overlap, in order to ensure that extra 
response capacity is available if the typical response strategies do not 
succeed. Public health emergency governance plans usually refer to 
redundancy in relation to specific logistical systems, like 
communications infrastructure, but the pretext of redundancy is found 
in many structural aspects of the existing system, including the local-
first orientation of the Stafford Act and the federalism-based 
reluctance of the federal government to more assertively manage 
emergencies. The redundancy envisioned by integrated pluralistic 
governance, however, takes a more extensive approach, by seeking to 
establish redundancy across concurrent systems in anticipation that 
some components of these systems will fail, especially during 
catastrophic events. 
The term “redundancy” exudes negative connotations of 
bureaucratic inefficiency, wastefulness, and operational confusion. 
Often, redundancy has been correctly criticized for complicating and 
 
281 See Lobel, supra note 18, at 385–87 (discussing the use of coordination in the 
integration of policy domains). 
282 NIMS, supra note 63, at 7; NHSS, supra note 271, at 1, 11. 
283 See Howitt & Leonard, supra note 45, at 218 (noting that some types of 
emergencies are so enormous that they necessitate adaptation and creativity in response). 
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confusing governance systems, including when redundant legal 
powers between public health and emergency response agencies 
provide conflicting mandates for who is in charge of the response 
effort.284 Nevertheless, redundancy should not be understood this 
way, as it is not inherently a negative concept. Professor Robert 
Cover argues persuasively that redundancy in some contexts can lead 
to innovation, protect rights, and help improve legal and social 
norms.285 While Professor Cover addresses redundancy in the legal 
system, his conception of “good redundancy” can be applied to a 
multivariate emergency response system. Achieving good redundancy 
in the public health emergency response system requires affirmative 
efforts to link disparate actors across systems and to foster 
harmonization and normative convergence. Harmonization can be 
cultivated through the New Governance techniques of coordination, 
communication, and participation. Diffuse governance models can 
advance good redundancy by providing multiple nodes to act as 
participants in governance, either in coordination with formal 
government processes, or in lieu of these processes if the system 
falters. Combined with concurrency and coordination, redundancy in 
this context provides a powerful path to a more resilient public health 
emergency response system. 
An integrated pluralistic governance strategy for public health 
emergencies would not necessarily be a panacea for dealing with 
failures of public health emergency responses. This strategy carries 
with it corresponding disadvantages of redundancy, inefficiency, and 
lack of coordination.286 Yet with careful consideration and significant 
effort, these problems too can be minimized. 
 
284 See Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13, at 65–70 
(discussing complications with dual declarations of emergency powers and conflicting 
agency responsibility for emergency response at the state level); Ryan, supra note 11, at 
522–28. 
285 See Cover, Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy, supra note 15, at 642–43 (showing 
that jurisdictional redundancy of parallel legal forums leads to better outcomes by 
allowing for the creation of new norms and permitting litigants to avoid corrupt judges); 
see also Cover, Dialectical Federalism, supra note 15, at 1045–65 (discussing the 
potential benefits of redundancy in the multilayered jurisdiction created by habeas corpus 
petitions). 
286 Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, supra note 18, at 355 
(“Problems are also a means and a product of the distribution of governance jurisdiction. 
Artificial, if not arbitrary, lines of responsibility lead to duplicative, incomplete, and 
counterproductive interventions, and sometimes to strange allocational results as resources 
are deployed within rationalities bounded by jurisdictional lines.”). 
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One troubling concern is the potential tension between different 
actors within an integrated pluralistic governance strategy. Conflict 
between parties within a system has been identified as a tool of New 
Governance, but in the context of an emergency response, 
competition, and therefore inefficiency and rivalry, are not welcome 
developments.287 Conflicts in this context ultimately may be 
unavoidable in some situations, but they can be forestalled by 
planning and transparency, ongoing open communication between 
different actors, additional research into the dynamics of the system to 
more clearly identify participants in governance and their potential 
roles, formal and informal planning sessions and debriefing sessions, 
pilot studies of different policy approaches, and development of 
expertise at all levels. Having all participants in governance—local to 
national, public to private to volunteer—agree on standardized 
procedures and norms, as recommended in NIMS and NHSS,288 will 
eliminate some areas of conflict and help with trust, predictability, 
and coordination. An integrated pluralistic governance strategy may 
need to impose default rules backed by law that resolve these 
tensions. This approach promotes clarity in situations where there is a 
disagreement between actors engaged in different aspects of public 
health emergency response, but should be circumscribed to avoid 
undermining the advantages of the pluralistic governance strategies, 
such as reimposing too much rigidity could weaken and undercut the 
value of concurrency. A good model for the default approach would 
be to adopt the allocations of authority currently outlined in the NRF 
and NIMS.289 
An equally challenging issue stems from redundancy within the 
integrated pluralistic governance strategy. The existence of redundant 
capacity—especially capacity developed for a catastrophic emergency 
that is likely to be a rare, but devastating, type of event—must be 
evaluated in light of the opportunity costs incurred by precluding 
other important uses of resources. Critics of emergency preparedness 
have challenged the need to expend resources on emergency-specific 
systems and instead suggest expenditures for more widely applicable 
 
287 See Lobel, supra note 18, at 379–81. 
288 NIMS, supra note 63, at 7; NHSS, supra note 273, at 5–13 (describing the roles, 
relationships, and approaches of various participants in the NHSS). 
289 See NIMS, supra note 63, at 5–7, 45–74; NRF, supra note 63, at 15–26. 
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public health projects or other interests altogether.290 Therefore, 
policymakers should align emergency preparedness infrastructure 
with other useful projects in a synergistic manner. Supplementing 
public health and healthcare capacity in local communities, for 
example, has population health benefits both during emergencies and 
generally. 
Successful coordination also will pose a challenge for an integrated 
pluralistic governance strategy. Public health emergencies, by 
definition, require a rapid, efficient response. A legitimate concern 
regarding this governance approach is that it may destroy the 
efficiency needed to successfully respond, needlessly complicate 
response efforts, and create problematic and unfair allocations of 
resources. Achieving coordination in the midst of an emergency will 
be challenging indeed. For this approach to succeed, significant 
planning and consensus on response strategies must be developed in 
advance to obviate the need for contemporaneous coordination of 
some components of the response. For example, if private sector 
entities or local government organizations know that they have the 
capacity and obligation to provide certain services, or that they will be 
compensated if they do so, they may be empowered to act without 
explicit permission by centralized decision makers. Admittedly, this 
solution is not completely satisfying, as there will be some aspects of 
a response, such as how to divide and allocate limited resources that 
will require contemporaneous coordination and real time judgment 
calls. 
Several specific approaches can be pursued to build redundancy 
into the public health emergency response system and thereby 
augment resilience in this system. First, the emergency response 
system should anticipate the possibility of failures at various points in 
the system hierarchy and plan for how alternative governance 
mechanisms will allow the system to function despite these failings. 
Using concurrent governance models, based on participation of 
private sector actors and the diffusion of responsibility across these 
many nodes of governance, can strengthen systemic resilience. The 
NRF, NIMS, and NHSS already support this type of governance 
stratification to a limited extent. Changes to the NRF to explicitly 
account for response efforts when the unified command structure is 
 
290 See CENTURY FOUND., supra note 81 (recommending a balance between emergency 
preparedness funding and other public health necessities). 
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not operable would further enable this strategy, perhaps in the form of 
a specific annex that addresses this issue in detail. 
The successful application of this strategy may require changes to 
the law to facilitate more extensive participation of nongovernmental 
actors. Precedents such as the ESAR-VHP volunteer program could 
provide lessons to emulate in this area, both in terms of organization 
and legal reform.291 Additionally, efforts at public education, social 
support, and media cooperation could improve individual and 
community resilience in the face of a serious public health 
emergency.292 Across all of these efforts, it will be important that 
public health emergency preparedness receives sufficient resources to 
maintain systemic resilience. 
Integrated pluralistic governance should also be utilized to protect 
against political favoritism in the allocation of resources or the 
prioritization of response activities. Communities with already strong 
resources and sophisticated planning and training will have inherent 
advantages during a catastrophic emergency. Communities without a 
strong resource base, which also may face challenges with health, 
education, housing, and transportation infrastructure on an everyday 
basis, will likely face even larger risks from a public health 
emergency. The devastation of the Lower Ninth Ward in New 
Orleans during Hurricane Katrina was the byproduct of numerous 
intersecting facets of vulnerability, among them the location of poor 
residents in the most at-risk sections of the city for flooding, lack of 
information available to residents about flooding risks, and limitations 
on the ability of residents to evacuate due to transportation and 
economic impediments.293 Beyond these factors, response decisions 
often reflect the direct and indirect biases that lead policymakers to 
target resources first to more politically powerful or organized 
constituencies. Michael Brown, the head of FEMA during the 
Hurricane Katrina response, famously said that it took so long to send 
federal support to residents sheltering at the New Orleans Superdome 
 
291 See generally Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13, 
at 65–70. 
292 See Monica Schoch-Spana et al., Meeting Report, Community Resilience 
Roundtable on the Implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 
(HSPD-21); 6 BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC. & SCI., 
269, 274 (2008); Fran H. Norris et al., Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set 
of Capacities, and Strategy for Disaster Readiness, 41 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL.127, 
142–46 (2008). 
293 See MCQUAID & SCHLEIFSTEIN, supra note 11, at 187–232. 
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because they did not know the people were there.294 In this context, 
redundant and parallel governance systems, in conjunction with legal 
protections, can counterbalance political favoritism in resource 
prioritization if alternative mechanisms of support can reach 
communities that may be ignored by formal decision makers.295 
Plans to invest additional resources in emergency preparedness and 
response activities likely will face political opposition from opponents 
who abhor expenditures on what they see as redundant or unnecessary 
projects, as well as those who are wary of public/private collaboration 
potentially benefiting private interests at the expense of the public 
good. The complicated politics of redundancy may limit the appeal of 
the integrated pluralistic governance strategy as a broader national 
endeavor.296 But the ongoing development of NRF and NHSS 
suggest a modest level of support for these general concepts and 
provide a framework upon which to build toward systemic resiliency 
for public health emergency response systems. Ultimately, the 
widespread, systematic adoption of integrated pluralistic governance 
is constrained by political and economic factors. However, less 
comprehensive adoption of this approach by selected localities, and 
through the expansion of already successful initiatives like ESAR-
VHP and MRC across the country, could move toward a more 
integrated and pluralistic governance framework for public health 
emergencies. 
The integrated pluralistic governance strategy thus retains the best 
features of traditional governance models—efficiency, adaptability, 
and accountability—and enhances these attributes with a robust 
network infrastructure. This approach would be more adaptable and 
flexible in its ability to function even if the decisional structure fails. 
Most importantly, this approach avoids system failure 
 
294 See Ryan, supra note 11, at 535 (citing Michael Brown’s statements on NBC Nightly 
News). 
295 This notion tracks somewhat Professor Cover’s observation that jurisdictional 
redundancy in the judicial system can help achieve justice, despite the presence of judges 
who explicitly or implicitly exert political favoritism in their rulings. See Cover, Uses of 
Jurisdictional Redundancy, supra note 15, at 660–62. 
296 Care must be exercised from a political perspective as well. Ideological opposition 
to federal support of emergency response (and to federal government activity in general) 
could seize upon this redundant strategy as a pretext for not engaging in government 
response efforts, in effect leaving the response to the private sector. This approach would 
be ill-advised, inefficient, and beset with conflicts of interest. The protocols for the system 
should prioritize levels of response and the roles of different participants, but should 
prevent government resources from being withdrawn in favor of private resources unless 
those private resources will be more effective in achieving good outcomes. 
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disproportionately contingent on the actions of decision makers. Had 
an integrated pluralistic governance strategy been in place during 
Hurricane Katrina, the dual governance failures at the root of the 
unsuccessful response efforts may have been averted as redundancy 
and coordination provided alternative mechanisms to facilitate 
response. Thus, an integrated pluralistic governance system, through a 
combination of notions of concurrency, coordination, and 
redundancy, can foster a more resilient public health emergency 
response system. 
CONCLUSION 
An integrated pluralistic governance strategy allows for the 
embrace of complex systems and recognizes that multiple governance 
models may coexist within these systems. Complex systems do not 
afford the luxury of a one-size-fits-all approach to governance, 
regulation, or application of law. This realization may seem a bit 
disconcerting especially in the context of a public health emergency, 
where certainty brings comfort and where propriety demands rapid 
reaction and results that are consistent, efficient, and competent. But 
the advantages of understanding governance as a complex process—
linked to a series of interlocking systems—are in the ability of an 
integrated pluralistic governance strategy to greatly enhance the 
resiliency and flexibility of public health emergency response 
systems. 
Efforts to strengthen and apply governance models concurrently 
through integrated pluralistic governance during public health 
emergencies could lead to a superior emergency response system that 
relies less on impeccable government implementation, clear chains of 
command, and centralized control. Supporting a mixture of 
concurrent, coordinated, and purposefully redundant governance 
strategies can enhance the capacity of the public health emergency 
response system to effectively function even when pushed past 
normal capacity. 
Public health emergency governance should be reimagined to meet 
current and future needs effectively. This will not be an easy exercise. 
Emergency preparedness is an inherently complex problem, needing 
plans and strategies to avert emergencies from both natural and man-
made threats. Effective preparedness entails the integration of 
scientific and medical expertise, good logistical planning, and clear 
laws and policies. Coordinating these interdisciplinary considerations 
GABLE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2012  8:39 AM 
456 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 375 
requires more than just strategic planning; it demands thoughtful 
approaches to emergency governance. The governance function has 
particular import for public health emergencies because pandemics 
and other disasters can have profoundly divisive social and political 
consequences. 
The response to Hurricane Katrina revealed many concerns about 
governance failure during public health emergency responses and 
reaffirmed the fact that the laws and plans on the books do not always 
translate well to practical implementation. Understanding the 
governance aspects of this system may help resolve this nefarious 
disconnect. As we contemplate future public health emergency 
governance, continued reliance on a model that concentrates authority 
and presumes top-down governance should be reassessed. By 
reimagining public health emergency governance, we can better 
understand the likely outcomes of our legal frameworks and policies 
in addressing health, and also devise and construct new systems that 
better comport with our goals and values. 
 
